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COMMENT
RUNNING FOR COVER UNDER SARBANES-OXLEY
Though it be honest, it is never good to bring bad news: give to a gracious message.
An host of tongues; but let ill tidings tell themselves when they be felt.
William Shakespeare l
I. INTRODUCTION
If fraudulent accounting in business is a rather old sin,2 shooting the messenger
may prove older still. Unlike white-collar crime, which is proscribed by law but not
frequently or severely penalized, 3 whistleblowing4 "is likely to be penalized with
impunity." 5 Case studies of whistleblowing suggest that "the characteristic trajectory of
whistleblowers' careers... is, with few exceptions, a downward spiral."
6
1. William Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, Act III, Scene V, http://www-tech.mit.edu/Shakespeare/
cleopatra/full.html (accessed Nov. 4, 2005).
2. See e.g. Evan T. Jones, Illicit Business: Accounting for Smuggling in Mid-Sixteenth-Century Bristol,
54 Econ. History Rev. 17 (2001); Sean McCartney & A.J. (Tony) Arnold, 'A Vast Aggregate ofAvaricious and
Flagitious Jobbing'? George Hudson and the Evolution of Early Notions of Directorial Responsibility, 11
Acctg., Bus. & Fin. History 117 (2001).
3. Nick Perry, Indecent Exposures: Theorizing Whistleblowing, 19 Org. Stud. 235, 239 (1998).
The United States Sentencing Commission's latest published statistics reveal that predominantly white collar
crimes such as fraud and embezzlement represent less than twelve percent of the total number of offenders
sentenced. White collar criminals predominantly receive probation and, if imprisoned, prison sentences well
below the average. U.S. Senten. Commn., 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbIs. 3, 12, 13,
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/SBTOC03.htm (accessed Oct. 28, 2005).
4. A "whistleblower" is "[a]n employee who reports employer illegality to a governmental or
law-enforcement agency." Black's Law Dictionary 1590 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). The term
also describes an employee who reports allegedly improper or illegal conduct to management. See e.g. N.Y.
Lab. L. § 740(2) (McKinney 2002) (A "whistleblower" includes an employee who discloses alleged
wrongdoing to a supervisor.). Additionally, the term also loosely describes an employee who does not actually
report the alleged wrongdoing but rather refuses to participate in it. See id.; infra pt. II.
5. Perry, supra n. 3, at 239.
6. Id. at 240. Some commentators have cast whistleblowing as equivalent to "occupational suicide"
or "accidental career death." Id. at 240-41. Perry also notes "whistleblowers are ... cautioned against going
public by the same authors who commend the integrity of those who do." Id. at 237; see also Miriam A.
Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act for Employment Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 1029, 1051-55 (2004).
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Corporate cultures,7 as a general rule, do not tolerate dissent well, 8 in part because
of the premium placed on loyalty not only to the organization, but also to those who lead
and manage it.9 Executive-level managers, in particular, stress the importance of getting
"on board" 10 and being a "team player" 1 1 -euphemistic language in many cases for
others to see things top management's way. 12 This social construction of reality,
13
coupled with the underlying subjective nature of accounting, 14 places a whistleblower's
idea of the truth at odds with most everyone else's in the organization 15 and, perhaps
more importantly, with that of top management. 16 All of this makes the whistleblower's
position a precarious one. inside the organization. As one lawmaker put it, corporate
7. A "corporate culture" is defined by the "set of beliefs, norms and practices that is shared by the
individuals in a group." Susan Key, Organizational Ethical Culture: Real or Imagined? 20 J. Bus. Ethics 217,
218 (1999) (emphasis in original). As such, it "can influence how ethical decisions are made, and the pressure
to adapt [one's] behavior to organizational culture may lead to unethical behavior." Id.
8. For example, a whistleblowing employee "runs the real risk of being branded as a 'snitch,' an
'informer,' or even a 'traitor,"' because whistleblowing is in "tension [with] accepted concepts of employee
loyalty." Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-at- Will Doctrine:
A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 543, 548 (2004) (citing in part
Dahl v. Combined Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (S.D. 2001)); see also Ira Chaleff, The Courageous
Follower: Standing up to &for Our Leaders 156 (2d ed., Berrett-Koehler 2003) ("[T]errific pressure may exist
in an organization to make a key measurement of organizational performance look good by using short-sighted,
questionable, or deceptive means. This pressure is symptomatic of deeper organizational dynamics."); Robert
Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers 109-10 (Oxford U. Press 1988) (citing as one of the
"fundamental rules" of organizational life, "tell[ing] your boss what he wants to hear, even when your boss
claims he wants dissenting views"); Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room:
The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron 28 (Portfolio 2003). Jeff Skilling, an executive at Enron,
"summarily dismissed [dissenters] as just not bright enough to 'get it."' Id. "Skilling, in particular, was
infamous for dividing the world into those who 'got it' and those who didn't. Internally, it was part of the
company's code." Id. at 233. While Skilling is perhaps an extreme case, top executives in other organizations
may differ from him only in degree-not kind. See generally Jackall, supra, at 75-100.
9. 148 Cong. Rec. S7420 (July 26, 2002) (noting that some companies have a "corporate culture that
punishes whistleblowers for being disloyal" (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Jackall, supra n. 8, at 26, 77 (concluding "[f]ealty is the mortar of the corporate hierarchy" and
"managers' essential problem is how to make things turn out.., as defined or expected by their bosses");
see generally Chaleff, supra n. 8.
10. Jackall,supran. 8, at 118.
11. Id. at 52-55.
12. Id. at 134 (noting "[m]anagers' public language is, more than anything else, euphemistic"). Other
commentators have pointed out that words used by managers such as "' [be] realistic' [are] therefore an
injunction to compute personal costs, rather than an invitation to attend to the content of truth." Perry, supra
n. 3, at 252.
13. See e.g. Jackall, supra n. 8, at 112-19.
14. Michael J. Barrett, Enron and Anderson-What Went Wrong and Why Similar Audit Failures Could
Happen Again, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications 155, 158-59 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala
G. Dharan eds., Found. Press 2004) ("[F]inancial accounting requires various estimates [and] generally
accepted accounting principles often allow alternative treatments for the same transaction."); Jeffrey D.
Bauman, Elliott J. Weiss & Alan R. Palmiter, Corporations Law and Policy: Materials and Problems 201 (5th
ed., West 2003) (noting "while the numbers in financial statements appear precise [they involve] many
subjective judgments").
15. See Jackall, supra n. 8, at 110-11. In recounting why a whistleblower had been fired, managers
reported that "irregular payments, doctored invoices, shuffling numbers in accounts [are] commonplaces of
corporate life" and the whistleblower had refused to recognize that truth is "socially defined, not absolute." Id.;
see also Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1051, 1054 (noting that both the law and co-workers have been "generally
unsympathetic" to whistleblowers and supervisors, and co-workers view the whistleblower as somehow
disloyal to organizational goals).
16. See Jackall, supra n. 8, at 75-100.
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managers "with help from their lawyers, know exactly what they can do to a
whistleblowing employee under the law."
17
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 18 attempts to improve the whistleblower's situation.
Yet, it remains unclear whether the Act's whistleblower provision 19 tempers these
cultural forces any more than existing state-level protection. A potential whistleblowing
employee is likely to consider available legal protection before blowing the whistle or
deciding how hard to push the issue with management. 20  This comment will analyze
and demonstrate that while the decision to blow the whistle may depend on the legal
protection afforded, the whistleblower's experience ultimately depends on the corporate
culture in which the employee resides. Stated another way, the fact that an employee
considers or seeks refuge in the type of protection offered by the Act suggests such
protection has little, if any, effect on corporate culture. Whistleblowers are still likely to
be penalized with impunity.
A. The Fastest Growing Category of Complaints
Prior to the passage of the Act in 2002, 2 1 whistleblowers within publicly traded
companies had to rely on common law exceptions to the doctrine of
employment-at-will 22 for protection against wrongful discharge,23 or find protection in
various area-specific federal24 and state statutes.2 5 Taken as a whole, these exceptions
and statutes created at best a "crazy-quilt" of varying levels of protection. 26 At their
worst, they provided no protection at all.
2 7
The Act addressed this state of affairs by federalizing whistleblowing protection in
corporate settings.28 Some lawmakers, for example, viewed the Act as a place to turn for
17. 148 Cong. Rec. S7420 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Pub. Co. Acctg. Reform & Investor Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The Act is codified in
§ 15 and § 18 U.S.C. (Supp. 2004); see U.S. C.A. Popular Name Table for Acts of Congress, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204 (available on Westlaw, "USCA-TABLES" database).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2004). For a discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provision, see
infra pt. Ill.
20. Cavico, supra n. 8, at 550.
21. See 116 Stat. 745.
22. The employment-at-will doctrine holds in part that an employee may be discharged "for good cause, for
no cause or even for cause morally wrong." Crain v. Natl. Am. Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2002).
23. Wrongful discharge is also referred to as retaliatory discharge. See Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 4,
at 476.
24. For a partial listing of federal statutes that relate to whistleblowing, see Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1121-23.
25. For a summary of state statutes that relate to whistleblowing, see Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry
Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 99 (2000); Cherry, supra
n. 6, at 1087-1120; Richard A. Leiter, 50 State Surveys Employment Whistleblower Statutes (West 2005)
(available at Westlaw, "SURVEYS" database).
26. See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. US., 545 U.S. 409, 427 (2005) (Breyer &
Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting) (noting a "crazy-quilt of limitations periods stitched together from the [retaliatory
discharge] laws of 51 jurisdictions"); see also 148 Cong. Rec. S7420 ("Corporate employees who report fraud
are subject to the patchwork and vagaries of current state laws." (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1042-51.
27. See Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1042-51.
28. Marc 1. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When the Whistle
Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 Iowa J. Corp. L. 445, 446-47 (2005); see also Robert G. Vaughn,
America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
2006]
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employees who knew of fraudulent practices but found themselves "trapped in a
corporate culture which squash[es] dissent."2 9 While debate continues on the import and
effect of the Act on corporate governance in general, 30 complaints filed under its
whistleblower provision 31 represent the fastest growing category of complaints filed with
the United States Department of Labor. 32 Within two years of the Act's passage, over
three hundred complaints by whistleblowers had been filed.33 The more than one
hundred whistleblower decisions issued by administrative law judges in 200534 represent
a two hundred percent increase from the thirty-two decisions issued in 2003.
35
Commentators, however, have paid relatively little attention to the Act's
whistleblower provision.3 6 Those who have addressed the whistleblower provision have
focused their discussions on categorizing the type of whistleblowing conduct protected,
defining who is considered an employee, identifying what action triggers an adverse
employment action under the Act, and finally, defining the elements of and legal burdens
associated with a whistleblower's claim. 37 Other commentators have focused on various
corporate policies or practices that potentially could work to minimize liability
exposure. 38  Few commentators have considered the sociological dimensions of
whistleblowing under the Act.
39
29. 148 Cong. Rec. S6301 (June 28, 2002) (statement of Senator Debbie Stabenow) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. See e.g. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public
Companies, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 317, 358-80 (2004); Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0.
Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 Del. J.
Corp. L. 79, 80 (2005); Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough? 2003 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 801 (2003).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
32. Whistleblower Complaints Growing, 39 Info. Mgt. J. 8 (May/June 2005).
33. Deborah Solomon, Risk Management: For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New Shield is an Imperfect One,
Wall St. J. Al (Oct. 4, 2004). Of the 317 complaints filed as of October 2004, 253 have been addressed and
sixty-four are pending. Id. Of those addressed, roughly seven out often have been dismissed and only one out
of six has favored the complainant. Id.
34. The number of decisions is based on case numbers assigned and reported by USDOL/OALJ Reporter,
Whistleblower Decisions Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806 2005-SOX, http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/
WHISTLEBLOWER/REFERENCES/CASELISTS/SOX2LIST.HTM (accessed Nov. 4, 2005). After a
complaint is filed with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), an investigation is
conducted. OSHA, Whistleblowers and Corporate Fraud, http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data
_WhistleblowerFacts/whistleblowers-corporatefraud-factsheet.pdf (accessed Nov. 8, 2005). Either party may
appeal the investigative findings and order issued by requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge of
the Department of Labor. Id. Therefore, the number of complaints filed and investigated is greater than the
number of hearings held or decisions issued.
35. USDOL/OALJ Reporter, Whistleblower Decisions Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806 2003 and 2004-SOX,
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLICIWHISTLEBLOWER/REFERENCES/CASELISTS/SOX1 LIST.HTM
(accessed Nov. 4, 2005).
36. Vaughn, supra n. 28, at 3.
37. See generally Terry F. Moritz, David E. Morrison & Katharine E. Burdic, Recent Developments in the
Interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Provisions, PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. 6236 (2005).
38. See Steinberg & Kaufman, supra n. 28.
39. Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1049.
[Vol. 41:573
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B. A Sociological Perspective
When viewed from a sociological perspective, the availability of the Act's
protection may have less of an effect on an employee's decision to blow the whistle than
do the pressures brought to bear by the employee's workplace culture,40 personal
hardships imagined or experienced as a result,4 1 and sporadic or uncertain
enforcement. 42 Whether the Act tempers these factors and provides a greater incentive
on the part of employees to report corporate fraud remains an open question.
The increasing number of complaints being filed under the Act could signal little more
than a shift in choice of venue. The increase could also be an indication that the Act
does provide an incentive for the employee but has not altered the employer's reaction to
whistleblowing. In that case, the repercussions faced by whistleblowers have remained
fundamentally unchanged.
To gain some insight into whether the Act made whistleblowing less sociologically
burdensome on the whistleblower, comparing the results of a case adjudicated under the
Act to what the result might have been under existing common law and statutory
protection may prove instructive. There may be no better case to use for this comparison
than Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp.43 David Welch, the former CFO of Bank of
Floyd (Virginia), was the first whistleblower to win employment protection under the
Act.44 Yet Welch remains unemployed by Bank of Floyd some three years after making
his allegations of insider trading and financial irregularities.
45
Would Welch have fared any better under Virginia's common law cause of action
for wrongful discharge? Would he have fared any better had he lived in some other
state? Whether a whistleblower like Welch is better served sociologically by the Act, by
state common law, or statutory protection may depend on the state and ultimately the
corporate culture in which the whistleblower resides.
C. Organization of this Comment
Part II of this comment provides a brief history of state whistleblower protection
and includes an overview of statutory and common law protection currently offered by
states to whistleblowers in publicly traded companies. Statutory whistleblower
provisions, for example, vary with respect to such elements as the specific type of
whistleblowing conduct protected, causation requirements, standards and burdens of
proof, and available remedies. Common law protections are not uniform, ranging from
40. Id. at 1052-54.
41. Id. at 1053; Perry, supra n. 3, at 240-41; see also Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1035-42 (recounting the story
of Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins and MCI whistleblower Cynthia Cooper); Sherron S. Watkins,
Ethical Conflicts at Enron: Moral Responsibility in Corporate Capitalism, 45 Cal. Mgt. Rev. 6 (Summer 2003)
(addressing the cultural dimensions and personal hardships associated with Watkins's whistleblowing
experience at Enron).
42. Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1051.
43. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX- 15 (Dept. Lab., Off. Admin. L. JJ. Jan. 28, 2004).
44. Telephone interview with D. Bruce Shine, Counsel for Mr. Welch, Shine & Mason Law Office,
Kingsport, Tenn. (Nov. 15, 2005); see also Karen Krebsbach, The Long Lonely Battle of David E. Welch, 115
U.S. Banker 30, 32 (Aug. 2005); Mark A. Stein, Whistle-Blower Wins, 154 N.Y. Times C2 (Feb. 27, 2005).
45. Telephone interview with D. Bruce Shine, supra n. 44; see also Steve Cocheo, SOX Whistleblower Law
Embroils Virginia Bank, 2005 ABA Banking J. 22, 28 (Sept. 2005).
2006]
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no protection whatsoever in certain states to, in some cases, greater protection than
comparable statutory provisions. Taken as a whole, state-level whistleblower protection
represents, at best, an uneven playing field and, at worst, an uncertain one from a
whistleblower's perspective.
Part III provides an overview of the Act's key whistleblowing provisions.
This overview provides an understanding of how the Act's protection differs from state
protection. Part IV reviews Welch, paying special attention to the application of the Act
to the facts of that case.
Part V applies Virginia common law to the facts of Welch. Part VI then analyzes
various states' whistleblowing laws-Louisiana, Delaware, Arkansas, and California-to
the facts of Welch. Virginia was chosen for the comparison because it is the state in
which the alleged corporate wrongdoing in Welch took place. California and Louisiana
were chosen because each state lies at opposite ends of the statutory protection
continuum. California has one of the latest, broadest, and, arguably, the toughest
46
whistleblowing statutes in the country, making it more sympathetic to whistleblowers.
Louisiana, in contrast, has a very narrowly tailored statute 47 and, unlike California,
offers no other exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will. 48 Delaware and
Arkansas were chosen because both states lie at (almost) opposite ends of the common
law protection continuum. Delaware, which is generally regarded as a business or
corporate friendly state,4 9 provides a rather narrow exception to the doctrine of
employment-at-will 5° and its recently passed statutory protection5 1 arguably poses a
stricter standard for alleged employer wrongdoing than does the Act. Arkansas's
common law protection is far broader than Delaware's in that it encompasses alleged
violations of federal law.52  The ultimate goal of this multi-state comparison is to
determine whether a different outcome would result in Welch under the various states'
laws versus the Act.
Part VII concludes this comment and discusses an element of corporate culture
found in Welch, which is common to many corporate settings. From the perspective of a
whistleblower, the Act might have leveled the playing field by filling in certain valleys
left untouched by state protection, but this leveling might also have failed to lower
46. See Joshua L. Baker, Chapter 484: The Strongest Whistleblower Protection Law in the Nation-Did We
Need lt, and Can We Really Afford It? 35 McGeorge L. Rev. 569 (2004).
47. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:967 (1998) (limiting protection to employees who disclose or threaten to disclose a
violation of state law, participate in an investigation held by a public body, or refuse to participate in a violation
of state law).
48. Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 820 So. 2d 542, 546 (La. 2002) (noting that "[a]side from federal and
state statutory exceptions, there are no broad policy considerations creating exceptions to employment at will"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. Bauman, Weiss & Palmiter, supra n. 14, at 61-63.
50. E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 441-42 (Del. Super. 1996) (noting the
public policy exception for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing must entail an "explicit and
recognizable public policy" but does not include discharge of an employee for disclosing questionable, but not
illegal, financial and business practices).
51. Del. Whistleblowers'Protec. Act, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1701-1708 (2005).
52. Northport Health Services, Inc. v. Owens, 158 S.W.3d 164, 174 (Ark. 2004) (holding a claim of
wrongful discharge available where discharge is in violation of a well-established public policy intended to
protect public interests and includes reporting a violation of state and federal law) (citing Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Ark. 1988)).
[Vol. 41:573
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organizational cultural barriers. In the context of corporate culture, neither the Act nor
various state approaches may have done much, if anything, to make whistleblowing less
sociologically burdensome.
II. STATE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
The past thirty years have brought about a significant change in the protection that
states have afforded to whistleblowers in the private sector.53 Until the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the doctrine of employment-at-will governed the employee-employer
relationship in all the states with few exceptions. 54 The at-will doctrine, which held in
part that an employee could be discharged "for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong," 55 favored employers who discharged a whistleblower for no
cause other than whistleblowing. The only exceptions to this general rule occurred, for
example, in those cases in which the whistleblower was not an at-will employee 56
or where the activity was protected by a federal statute that contained an anti-retaliation
provision. 57 Federal statutes, however, tended to be both narrow and area-specific 58
and often precluded coverage of private sector employees who had reported corporate
wrongdoing unless federal funds were somehow involved.59
Many states have recognized the inherent unfairness of the at-will doctrine. 60
That recognition, coupled with the state's interest in exposing governmental and
corporate wrongdoing, 6 1 led to protections for whistleblowers in the private sector.
Those protections took two forms: judicially created exceptions based on public policy 62
53. See Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 517,
519-22 (2004); Callahan & Dworkin, supra n. 25, at 99, 105-08. Whether this change has been accompanied
by a shift in general societal norms toward whistleblowing is unclear. See Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblowing
at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste, andAbuse on the Job 21-37 (Westview Press 1999).
54. Some commentators cite a 1959 California Court of Appeals decision, Peterman v. Intl. Bd. of
Teamsters, 314 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), as the first state case to adopt the tort theory of firing in violation
of a public policy. E.g. Callahan & Dworkin, supra n. 25, at 105-06. Twenty years then passed "before a
significant number of state courts were willing to erode employer autonomy" by adopting a public policy
exception for whistleblowers. Id. at 106.
55. Crain, 52 P.3d at 1038.
56. See e.g. Rothrock v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 883 A.2d. 511, 512 n. 1 (Pa. 2005) (noting that
historically an employment contract provided an exception to the at-will employment doctrine).
57. See Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1049-50.
58. See id. at 1121-23 (classifying federal whistleblower laws under categories that include
environmental/public health and welfare, fraud/false claims, health care, and safety and transportation).
59. See e.g. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(h) (2000) (fraud against the U.S. government).
60. See e.g. James A. Henderson, Jr., Richard N. Pearson & John A. Siliciano, The Torts Process 841
(6th ed., Aspen 2003) (citing Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. App. 1985)). The court in Sides,
citing public policy concerns, stated that "'at-will' can never mean 'without limit or qualification"' and held
that "no employer has the right to discharge an [at-will] employee ... without civil liability because he refuses
to testify untruthfully or incompletely in a court case." Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 826; see Henderson, Jr., Pearson &
Siliciano, supra, at 841-42 (quoting Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 826); see also Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.,
396 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. App. 1986) (discussing employee and societal interests in allowing for an
exception to the at-will doctrine) (citing Palmateer v. Intl. Harvestor Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Il1. 1981)).
61. See e.g. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 104-07 (Colo. 1992) (protecting employee
conduct which exposes employer wrongdoing is an important public policy).
62. For a review of state common law protection for both public and private sector whistleblowers,
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and legislation that granted specific protections to private sector whistleblowers. 63
Today, only three states-Alabama, Georgia, and New York-provide no common law
or statutory protection to whistleblowers who report alleged corporate financial
wrongdoing. 64  Four other states-Florida, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island-also
provide no common law protection,65 but do provide some form of statutory
protection.66 Another thirteen states,6 7 including California, Hawaii, and Michigan,
provide both common law 68 and statutory protection, 69 with statutory protection in
63. See e.g. Michigan's Whistle-blowers' Protec. Act, Mich. Comp. L. Ann. §§ 15-361-15-369
(West 2004). Michigan was the first state to extend whistleblower protection to private employees. Frederick
Elliston, John Keenan, Paula Lockhart & Jane van Schaick, Whistleblowing: Managing Dissent in the
Workplace 9 (Praeger 1985). A review of state statutory protection for both public and private sector
whistleblowers is found in Callahan & Dworkin, supra n. 25, at 107-22; Cavico, supra n. 8, at 552-89;
Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1087-1120; see also Leiter, supra n. 25.
64. See generally e.g. Hoffman-LA Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987)
(holding at-will employee "may be terminated... with or without cause or justification"); Eckhardt v. Yerkes
Regl. Primate Ctr. 561 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. App. 2002) (declining to create a public policy exception for
whistleblowers); Lobosco v. N.Y. Tel. Co/Nynex, 751 N.E.2d 462, 464 (N.Y. 2001) (stating New York does not
recognize wrongful discharge and there are no public policy exceptions, including "discharge for exposing an
employer's illegal activities"). All states, including Alabama, Georgia, and New York, provide narrow,
area-specific statutory protection to private-sector employees in many of the areas also addressed by federal
protection. See Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1087-1120. New York provides statutory protection for participation in
an investigation held by public body, or disclosure to supervisor or public body of violation of law, rule, or
regulation, the violation of which "creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to public health and
safety" or refusal to participate in any such violation. N.Y. Lab. L. § 740(2). It is unlikely that corporate
financial wrongdoing presents such a danger.
65. See generally e.g. Lurton v. Muldon Motor Co., 523 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1988)
(stating that an action for wrongful discharge is not available for an at-will employee); Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d
at 546 (noting that "[a]side from federal and state statutory exceptions, there are no 'broad policy
considerations creating exceptions to employment at will'); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152,
156 (Me. 1991) (declining to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge); Pacheo v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464,
465 (R.I. 1993) (emphasizing that there is no common law cause of action for wrongful discharge).
66. See generally e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 448.102 (West 2002) (participation in an investigation held by a
public body or, after giving notice to the employer and providing a reasonable opportunity to correct,
disclosure of, or refusal to participate in, a violation of a law, rule, or regulation); La. Stat. Ann. § 23:967
(1998) (participation in investigation held by a public body or disclosure of, or refusal to participate in, a
violation of state law); 26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 831-840 (1988) (participation in an investigation conducted
by a public body and disclosure of violation of a federal or state law or rule to an employer or public body);
R.I. Gen. L. §§ 28-50-1-28-50-3 (2003) (participation in an investigation held by a public body or disclosure to
employer or public body of a violation of federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation "which the employee
knows or reasonably believes has occurred or is about to occur," or refusal to assist in violating a law, rule, or
regulation).
67. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
68. See generally e.g. Sinatra v. Chico Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 664 (Cal. App. 3d Dist.
2004) (holding discharge must violate a public policy that is "'fundamental' and 'substantial' in that it is
tethered to constitutional or statutory law [including] refusal to violate a statute, performing a statutory
obligation, exercising a statutory or constitutional right or privilege, or reporting an alleged violation of a
statute of public significance" (numbering omitted)); Krauss v. Catholic Health Initiatives Mt. Region, 66 P.3d
195, 203 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding discharge must "[contravene] a clear mandate of public policy" and
occurs where an employee is discharged for exercising a statutory right or privilege) (citing Lorenz, 823 P.2d
at 100); Tomei v. Sharp, 902 A.2d 757, 769 (Del. Super. 2006) (holding covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is "an implied part of every employment contract"); Fa v. Brigham Young U.-Haw., 98 P.3d 246 (Haw. 2004)
(unpublished disposition) (holding discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy as evidenced by
statutory or regulatory provisions); McGarrity v. Berlin Metals, Inc., 774 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ind. App. 2002)
(stating wrongful discharge available to at-will employee "discharged solely for exercising a statutorily
conferred right" or "allegedly fired for refusing to commit an unlawful act for which he would be personally
liable"); Baker v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 608 N.W.2d 823, 832 n. 3 (Mich. App. 2000) (noting a common law
cause of action is available when an employee has been discharged for failing or refusing to perform an illegal
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Colorado and Indiana limited to situations involving private employers under public
contract.70 Two states, Alaska and Delaware, allow a whistleblower to bring a cause of
action under breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 71 with Alaska
also providing a tort cause of action. 72 The remaining twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia provide various forms of common law protection absent any state statutory
protection relating to the disclosure of corporate financial wrongdoing.
7 3
act and when there is no applicable statutory prohibition against such a discharge); Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) (holding that an employee who is discharged "for refusing
to participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or
regulation"); see also Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 351-52 (Minn. 2002) (noting the
decision in Phipps, 408 N.W.2d 569, was prior to the enactment of the state's Whistleblower Act); Porter v.
City of Manchester, 849 A.2d 103, 114 (N.H. 2004) (holding elements of wrongful discharge claim includes a
showing that the discharge resulted from the employee "perform[ing] an act that public policy would
encourage, or refus[ing] to do something that public policy would condemn" (quoting Cloutier v. Great A. & P.
Tea Co., Inc., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Maw v. Adv. Clinical
Commun., Inc., 846 A.2d. 604, 607 (N.J. 2004) (holing discharge violates a "clear mandate of public policy"
found in a constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation such that "there should be a high degree of public
certitude in respect of acceptable versus unacceptable conduct"); Vandall v. Trinity Hosp., 676 N.W.2d 88, 91
(N.D. 2004) (holding discharge "contravene[s] a clear statement of public policy in a constitutional or a
statutory provision"); Daniels v. Fraternal Or. of Eagles Aerie of Tecumseh #979, 833 N.E.2d 1253, 1258
(Ohio App. 2d Dist. 2005) (holding an element of public policy tort includes showing that discharge of
similarly situated employees would jeopardize public policy) (citing Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio
1995)).
69. See generally Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1102.5 (West Supp. 2005) (disclosure of violation or refusal to
participate in a violation of a federal or state statute, rule, or regulation); id. at § 1106 (protection extends to
employees of public corporations); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51m (West 2003) (disclosure to a public body
of a violation of a federal or state law or regulation or participation in investigation held by public body); id. at
§ 33-1336 (protection mirrors that found in the Act's whistleblower provision, 18 U.S.C. 1514A); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 19, § 1703 (2005) (disclosure to public body or employer of actual or suspected violation of federal or
state law, rule, or regulation or participation in investigation held by public body); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62
(Supp. 2005) (disclosure to a public body of violation or suspected violation of a state or federal law, rule,
ordinance, or regulation or participation in investigation held by a public body); Mich. Comp. L. Ann.
§§ 15-361-15-369 (disclosure to a public body of a suspected violation of state or federal law, regulation, or
rule); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.932 (West 2004) (participating in an investigation held by a public body; good
faith disclosure of a violation or suspected violation of state or federal law or rule; or refusal based on an
objective belief, to participate in a violation); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-E:2 (1999) (good faith disclosure of
violation or suspected violation of federal or state law or rule, or participation in investigation held by a public
body); Conscientious Employee Protec. Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:19-1-34:19-8 (2000) (participation in an
investigation held by a public body, disclosure to a supervisor or public body of an activity that the employee
reasonably believes is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation, or refusal to participate in activity that is
fraudulent or criminal or "incompatible with clear mandate of public policy"); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-20
(2004) (participation in an investigation held by a public body, good faith disclosure of a violation or suspected
violation of federal, state, or local law, ordinance, regulation, or rule, or refusal to participate in an activity that
employee objectively believes violates the law); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.52 (West Supp. 2005)
(disclosure of a felony in violation of a federal or state statute, rule, or regulation); Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa.
Consol. Stat. Ann. §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991) (good faith disclosure of a violation of a federal or state statute
or regulation).
70. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-114-102 (West 2004) (limited to employees of companies under contract
with a state agency who discloses information to a public body which, if not disclosed, could endanger public
health, safety, or welfare or adversely affect state interests); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-3 (LEXIS 2005)
(limited to employees of private employers that are under public contract and who disclose a violation of
federal or state law, regulation, rule, or ordinance).
71. E.g. Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158, 167 (Alaska 1999) (holding whistleblowers can bring
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Pressman, 679 A.2d at 441
(recognizing breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the exception to the at-will doctrine).
72. See e.g. Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427, 438 (Alaska 2004) (holding that a tort remedy
for wrongful discharge is appropriate in cases in which there is a violation of an explicit public policy).
73. See Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1087-1120; infra pt. II.A.
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A. Little in Common, Common Law Protection
Common law protection for private whistleblowers varies according to a number
of factors. One significant factor is whether the whistleblowing is external or internal.
74
Other factors include the reasonableness of the whistleblower's belief, whistleblower
complicity in the wrongdoing, standards and burdens of proof, and statutes of
limitations. 7 5 However, for the purposes here, the most important factors are the type of
whistleblowing conduct protected and the remedies available to the whistleblower.
76
Protection depends upon whether some public policy77 of the state incorporates the
subject matter about which the whistleblower complains. 78  As a general rule, a
whistleblower has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if the discharge or other
adverse employment action79 contravenes, jeopardizes, or violates some public policy of
the state.
80
The public policy exceptions of some states are likely to protect the very type of
whistleblowing covered by the Act.8 1 For example, some jurisdictions have defined the
act of whistleblowing itself as a public policy deserving of protection. 82  For others,
federal statutes and regulations provide the source of public policy deserving of
74. Internal whistleblowing involves disclosure to a supervisor or employer. External whistleblowing
involves disclosure to a public body. Cavico, supra n. 8, at 599-601.
75. See id. at 589-609.
76. Several reviews of the various factors of state common law protection are available. See e.g.
Callahan & Dworkin, supra n. 25; Cavico, supra n. 8; Cherry, supra n. 6. Cavico's treatment of the common
law protection served as the basis for this section of the article.
77. One source defines "public policy" as "principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the
courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society." Black's Law Dictionary, supra
n. 4, at 1267.
78. Barker v. St. Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 469 (Okla. 2001) ("In whistle-blower cases, the answer to
[the policy question] determines the subjects about which a whistle-blower may or may not legitimately
complain.").
79. Adverse employment actions include reassignment and constructive discharge. See Korslund v.
Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 88 P.3d 966, 976-77 (Wash. App. Div. 3d 2004).
80. Idaho, Virginia, and Washington are examples. See generally e.g. Anderson v. ITT Industries Corp., 92
F. Supp. 2d 516, 522 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that a claim for wrongful discharge must involve either "(i) a
statutorily-created right which the termination interferes with or violates, or (ii) a statutorily-imposed duty
which the employee is terminated for refusing to violate"); Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733,
737-38 (Idaho 2003) (stating the only general exception to employment-at-will is where the motivation for the
discharge contravenes public policy as found in the state's statutes and constitution, and includes protection for
employees "who refuse to commit unlawful acts, who perform important public obligations, or who exercise
certain legal rights or privileges"); Alaiyan v. Insightful Corp., 2005 WL 1406003 at *3 (Wash. App. Div. 1st
June 13, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (listing as one of the elements of a wrongful discharge claim a showing
that discouraging the conduct in which the employee engaged in would jeopardize a "clearly articulated" public
policy and noting this includes discharge for refusing to perform an illegal act, performing a legal duty,
exercising a legal right, or reporting employer misconduct).
81. The Act does not protect whistleblowing on all types of fraudulent conduct. Cavico, supra n. 8, at
556-57. Rather, the fraudulent conduct must involve a violation of federal securities laws, a federal law
relating to shareholder fraud, or a Securities and Exchange Commission rule or regulation. Id; see 18 U.S.C.
1514(A)(1).
82. Illinois and South Carolina are examples. See generally e.g. Geary v. Telular Corp., 793 N.E.2d 128,
133-34 (Il1. App. I st Dist. 2003) (noting the exception for discharge in violation of a "clearly mandated public
policy" is a narrow one, limited to situations "where the discharge stems from asserting a worker's
compensation claim ... or for activities referred to as 'whistle-blowing"' (citations omitted)); Dahl, 621
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protection, 83 and the Act certainly qualifies as such. In other states, the whistleblowing
must relate to acts subject to criminal penalties, and the Act provides for such
penalties.
85
In a number of other states, however, it is less clear that the public policy exception
would protect those whistleblowers. For example, certain states limit the source of
public policy to state laws and regulations, 86 and there may be no state-level law or
regulation equivalent to the Act. The absence of an equivalent law might leave a
whistleblower completely unprotected, especially in those states which refuse to
recognize the act of whistleblowing as a public policy deserving of protection.
87
Protection in other jurisdictions depends on whether the whistleblowing somehow
furthered the public interest 88 or whether the public policy itself was aimed specifically
at providing protection to the employee. 89 Still other states define the policy exception
narrowly in terms of the employer's allegedly wrongful conduct that gave rise to the
whistleblowing. 90  In other jurisdictions, protection turns on whether the whistleblower
83. The District of Columbia and Maryland are examples. Pope v. Romac Intern, 829 A.2d 945, 947 n. 3
(D.C. 2003) (holding discharge must be based on some "identifiable policy thathas been 'officially declared'
in a statute... or the Constitution"); King v. Marriott Intl., Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 901-02, 902 n. 8 (Md. Spec.
App. 2005) (holding discharge must violate a clear mandate of public policy and is limited to situations "where
an employee has been fired for refusing to violate [a federal or state] law or the legal rights of a third party, and
where an employee has been terminated for exercising a legal right or duty").
84. Mississippi and South Carolina are examples. E.g. Hammons v. Fleetwood Homes of Miss., Inc., 907
So. 2d 357, 360 (Miss. App. 2004) (noting that the act complained of must warrant criminal penalties and not
merely civil penalties); Antley v. Shepherd, 532 S.E.2d 294, 297-98 (S.C. App. 2000) (holding discharge
violates a "clear mandate" of public policy and includes situations where the employee has refused to violate a
criminal law).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b), (c) (Supp. 2004) (imposing criminal penalties for corporate officers who certify
periodic financial reports "knowing" the information contained therein does not "fairly present, in all material
respects, the financial conditions and results").
86. Kentucky and Pennsylvania are examples. See generally e.g. Wetherhold v. Radioshack Corp., 339
F. Supp. 2d 670, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding discharge must violate "'a clear mandate of public
policy.., embodied in a [state] constitutionally or legislatively established prohibition, requirement, or
privilege"' rather than a possible violation of a federal statute (quoting Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp.,
917 F.2d 1338, 1344 (3d Cir. 1990)); Shrout v. The TFE Group, 161 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Ky. App. 2005)
(clarifying exceptions to the at-will doctrine as including the discharge of an employee for refusing to violate a
law or when discharge is contrary to a "fundamental and well-defined public policy" including exercising a
right defined by a state statute and directed at providing protection to the employee).
87. Virginia is an example. See e.g. Dray v. New Mkt. Poultry Prods., 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 (Va. 1999)
(refusing to recognize whistleblowing as an exception to the at-will doctrine).
88. Arkansas is an example. See generally e.g. Owens, 158 S.W.3d at 174 (holding a claim of wrongful
discharge available where discharge is in violation of a well-established public policy intended to protect public
interests and includes reporting a violation of state and federal law).
89. Kentucky and Massachusetts are examples. See generally e.g. Shrout, 161 S.W.3d at 354-55
(clarifying exceptions to the at-will doctrine as including discharge of an employee for exercising a right
defined by a state statute and directed at providing protection to the employee); Fernandes v. The Talbots, Inc.,
2005 WL 1009749 at *2 n. 1 (Mass. Super. Mar. 18, 2005) (mem.) (noting three public policy exceptions to the
at-will doctrine--discharge for "asserting a legally guaranteed right.... for doing what the law requires. .. or
for refusing to do what the law forbids" (quoting GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 26 (Mass. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. Nevada is an example. See e.g. Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Nev. 1998) (noting
wrongful discharge actions are limited to those "rare and exceptional cases" in which "the employer's conduct
violates strong and compelling public policy" (quoting Sands Regent v. Valgardson, 777 P.2d 898, 900
(Nev. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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disclosed or refused to participate in the alleged wrongdoing,9 1 whereas others limit it
only to refusal-a constructive rather than actual act of disclosure.
92
Perhaps the greatest source of uncertainty as to whether a specific type of
whistleblowing is protected involves the standard by which the public policy itself is
judged.93 The standard used by the court in deciding the scope of the public policy
determines "where and how to draw the line between claims.., that are actionable and
ordinary disputes between employee and employer that are not."94 Standards vary from
state-to-state and include strong or compelling, 95 well-established or "not subject to any
substantial doubt,"9 6 clear or well-defined, 97 and sufficient or important. 98  Courts in
many cases debate the definition of those standards, 99 leading some to cast a rather broad
net and consider such factors as "community common sense.'1°° Other courts find the
91. Mississippi and Missouri are examples. See generally e.g. McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co.,
626 So. 2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993) (holding refusal to participate in, or reporting of, an illegal act as public
policy exceptions to employment-at-will); Dunn v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 170 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. 2005)
(holding an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge if discharge resulted from "refusing to
perform an illegal act or... reporting wrongdoing or violations of law or public policy" (quoting Porter v.
Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 935-36 (Mo. App. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92. For example, Texas limits the at-will exception to refusal to perform an illegal act. See generally e.g.
Laredo Med. Group Corp. v. Mireles, 155 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex. App. San Antonio Dist. 2004) (holding a
"narrow exception [to the at-will doctrine] covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the
employee refused to perform an illegal act" (quoting Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735
(Tex. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. See Barker, 40 P.3d at 469.
94. Id.
95. California, Nevada, and Utah are examples. See generally e.g. Sinatra, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664; Allum,
970 P.2d at 1068; Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 952 (Utah 2004) (holding discharge must implicate
a "clear and substantial" public policy and is limited to "(i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful
act... ; (ii) performing a public obligation... ; (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege... ; or (iv) reporting
to a public authority criminal activity of the employer" (citing Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395,
408 (Utah 1998)) (citations omitted)).
96. Kansas and Oklahoma are examples. Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Kan. 1988) (holding
public policy exception available where the policy is "so thoroughly established ... that its existence is not
subject to any substantial doubt" (quoting Noel v. Menninger Found, 267 P.2d. 934, 941 (Kan. 1954)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Crain, 52 P.3d at 1039 (holding discharge must violate an established and
well-defined public policy "grounded in a statute or employee actions, such as reporting fraudulent activity or
criminal misuse of funds").
97. New Mexico and Wisconsin are examples. See generally e.g. Silva v. Am. Fedn. of St., Co. & Mun.
Employees, 37 P.3d 81, 83 (N.M. 2001) (holding the at-will doctrine is limited to those cases in which the
discharge "results from the employer's violation of a clear public policy" (citing Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613,
619 (N.M. App. 1983))); Goggins v. Rogers Meml. Hosp., Inc., 683 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Wis. App. 2004)
(holding discharge must involve a "fundamental and well-defined public policy.., evidenced by a
constitutional or statutory provision" (citations omitted)).
98. Arizona and Oregon are examples. See generally e.g. Murcott v. Best Western Intl., Inc., 9 P.3d 1088,
1096 (Ariz. App. Div. 1st 2000) (noting as one element of a whistleblowing claim "some important public
policy interest ... furthered by the whistleblowing activity" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Yeager v. Providence Health Sys., 96 P.3d 862, 865-66 (Or. App. 2004) (holding discharge for "exercising of a
job-related right that reflects an important public policy" defined by constitutional and statutory provisions and
case law (citations omitted)).
99. See Cavico, supra n. 8, at 590-91.
100. Arizona, Vermont, and West Virginia are examples. Murcott, 9 P.3d at 1096 (The "matter must strike
at the heart of the citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities." (citation omitted)); Adams v. Green Mt.
R.R., 862 A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 2004) (holding discharge must be against a "clear and compelling" public policy
as defined by "community common sense and common conscience" such as employer conduct that "is cruel or
shocking to the average [person's] conception of justice" (quoting Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588-89
(Vt. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted, bracket in original)); Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713,
718 (W. Va. 2001) (holding discharge must contravene a "substantial" public policy, grounded in state statutes,
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standard only in explicit statutory language. 
10 1
For those whistleblowers who find their respective state does protect the subject
matter involved under its public policy exceptions, several legal hurdles still remain.
Because there is no "rumor spreader exception" to the doctrine of
employment-at-will, 102 the whistleblower must often show, at a minimum, personal
knowledge of wrongdoing and a "good faith concern" regarding the wrongful
conduct. 10 3 In addition to good faith, some states require the whistleblower to hold a
reasonable belief the employer's conduct violates a law or public policy.' 0 4 Some states
go so far as to require the whistleblower to cite the specific law allegedly violated. 10 5
While a showing of good faith is particularly important in those situations involving an
erroneous whistleblower, 106 in other states a good faith or reasonable belief may not
save the whistleblower's claim-there must be an actual violation of the policy
or law. 1
07
Remedies also vary, with some states holding that a wrongful discharge claim
sounds in contract, thereby limiting the remedy to lost wages and benefits. 10 8 Under the
contract theory, the employee has a duty to mitigate his or her losses.' 0 9 Other states
hold the cause of action sounds in tort, thereby making available to the discharged
employee compensatory damages as well as punitive damages.110 The equitable remedy
of reinstatement of employment may be available, but "as a practical matter [it] is
frequently very difficult to secure."
1 11
regulations, or cases, and "widely regarded as to be evident to employers and employees alike").
101. Connecticut and Tennessee are examples. See e.g. Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, L.L.C.,
802 A.2d 731, 736-37 (Conn. 2002) (holding discharge must be "predicated upon an employer's violation of
an important and clearly articulated public policy," where the discharge has "violated any explicit statutory or
constitutional provision"); Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Tenn. 2002) (holding
discharge contravenes a "well-defined and established public policy" as evidenced by "an unambiguous
constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision [including] refusing to remain silent about [an employer's]
illegal activities" (citations omitted)).
102. Barker, 40 P.3d at 471.
103. Goodman v. Wesley Med. Ctr., L.L.C., 78 P.3d 817, 821 (Kan. 2003). Minnesota provides another
example of this. See e.g. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571 (holding that an employee may bring a wrongful
discharge action "for refusing to participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any
state or federal law or rule or regulation").
104. Goodman, 78 P.3d at 821 (citing as an element of a retaliatory discharge claim a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that a "reasonably prudent person would have concluded the.., employer was engaged
[in wrongdoing]"); see also e.g. Allum, 970 P.2d at 1068 (holding a claim for wrongful discharge "available to
an employee who was terminated for refusing to engage in conduct that he ... reasonably believed to be
illegal"). South Carolina applies a different standard. Antley, 532 S.E.2d at 298 (holding protection does not
extend to those cases in which the employee "refus[es] to comply with a directive which she simply believes
would require her to violate the law" (emphasis in original)).
105. See e.g. Dunn, 170 S.W.3d at II (stating public policy is served by employees reporting suspected
wrongdoing but a claim deserving of protection requires citing the specific law allegedly violated).
106. See Cavico, supra n. 8, at 597.
107. For example, in the state of Washington, "[i]n situations not involving imminent harm, the plaintiff may
be required to prove an actual violation of the policy." Korslund, 88 P.3d at 978. Arizona takes a different
approach. Murcott, 9 P.3d at 1096 (holding an actual violation of a law or regulation need not be proven).
108. See Cavico, supra n. 8, at 605-07.
109. See id. at 606 n. 319, 607.
110. Id. at607-08.
111. Id. at 607.
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B. Less Than Uniform Statutory Protection
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Model Employment Termination Act, which provided for protection against wrongful
discharge, in an attempt to remedy state-to-state variations and other problems associated
with the growing number of common law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
However, to date, no state has adopted this model statute in whole or in part.
112
Similarly, the National Whistleblower Center has proposed a model statute, 113 but it is
not current law. 
114
While a uniform whistleblower law has not been adopted, a number of states have
adopted whistleblower statutes that protect subject matter beyond area-specific statutes
relating to public health, safety, and the environment. 115 However, the variation in state
statutory protection mirrors to a certain extent that found in state common law
protection. 116  As with differences in common law protection, the most important
difference in statutory protection for the purposes here is the type of whistleblowing
conduct protected and remedies available to the whistleblower.
In general, state statutory protection of private-sector whistleblowers typically
addresses one or more types of whistleblowing: (1) disclosing or threatening to disclose
employer wrongdoing; (2) assisting or participating in an investigation conducted by a
public body; and (3) objecting or refusing to participate in the employer's
wrongdoing. 117  Some states, for example, limit protection to the first two,
118
while other states extend protection to the third in either broad'
19 or narrow terms. 120
States which extend protection to this third type of whistleblowing conduct go
further than the Act, which limits protection to disclosure and assistance. 12 1 In addition,
because whistleblowing statutes are directed toward violations of federal and state
statutes, regulations, and rules, 122 they arguably encompass subject matter far beyond
that encompassed by the Act. 
123
112. Bird, supran. 53, at 524.
113. Nail. Whistleblower Ctr., The National Whistleblower Protection Act, http://www.whistleblowers.org/
htmVmodelwhistleblower__law.htm (accessed Nov. 5, 2005).
114. For a comparison of this model statute with that of state statutory protection, see Cavico, supra n. 8,
at 552-89.
115. Id. at 552-609; Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1087-1120.
116. See generally Cavico, supra n. 8.
117. Id. at 549. The discussion in this section makes use of Cavico's classification and treatment of state
whistleblower statutes. See id. at 552-89.
118. Hawaii and Michigan are examples. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62; Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 15.362.
119. California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island are examples. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 1102.5(c) (extending
protection for refusal to participate in any activity that would result in a violation of federal or state law, rule,
or regulation); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c) (extending protection to refusal to participate in fraudulent and
criminal conduct); R.I. Gen. L. § 28-50-3(3) (refusal to violate or assist in violating a federal, state, or local
law, rule, or regulation).
120. Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Dakota are examples. Minn. Stat. § 181.932(c) (protection for
refusal extends only to an employee who has "an objective basis in fact to believe" the action violates a law,
rule, or regulation and informs the employer as to the reason for refusal); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-E:3
(refusal relates to "a directive which in fact violates an law or rule"); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-20(l)(c).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A)(a)(l). Michigan, while not extending statutory protection to refusal conduct,
does provide common law protection for it. Baker, 608 N.W.2d at 832 n. 3.
122. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island are examples. See supra n. 69 and
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Exceptions do exist. Connecticut, for example, has a statute that mirrors the
Act124 and, therefore, does not extend beyond the wrongdoing required by the federal
statute. 125  In addition, its statutory protection precludes any common law cause of
action.126 Louisiana's statute, in contrast, requires a violation of state law, 1 2 7 making it
potentially far narrower than the Act. Absent an equivalent state law, a potential
whistleblower of corporate financial wrongdoing in Louisiana is entirely dependent upon
the Act for protection. 1
28
Even in those states that provide broader coverage relative to the Act, that
coverage is tempered in many cases by restrictions placed on the manner in which the
employee blows the whistle. 12 9 While statutes typically require good faith on the part of
the whistleblower, 130 some states specifically require that the whistleblower make a
reasonable effort to ascertain the accuracy of the information reported. 13 1 Other states
require that prior notice be given to the employer. 132 Still, other states do not have the
notice requirement 133 or provide an exception to it. 134 In addition to notice, some states
require the employer be provided an opportunity to correct the alleged violation before
any protection is provided to the whistleblower. 135 Others go further, requiring the
whistleblowing itself be done in writing. 1
36
accompanying text.
123. See supra n. 80 and accompanying text.
124. Chenarides v. Bestfoods Baking, 2005 WL 1088983 at **3, 4 n. 6 (Conn. Super. Mar. 30, 2005)
(unpublished opinion) (noting the protection afforded by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-1336 mirrors the federal
statutory rule found in Sarbanes-Oxley); see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-1336. Connecticut does, however, have
another statute that covers other subject matter and protects external whistleblowing. Chenarides,
2005 WL 1088983 at **3, 4 n. 6 (noting that statutory protection afforded by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51im
protects external whistleblowing); see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51 m.
125. See infrapt. I1.
126. Campbell v. Town of Plymouth, 811 A.2d 243, 250 (Conn. App. 2002) (emphasizing that where a
statutory cause of action for a whistleblower is provided, the public policy exception does not apply); but see
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-E:5 (whistleblower statute has no effect on any common law rights).
127. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:967(A); Hale v. Touro Infinnary, 886 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 896 So. 2d 1036 (La. 2005) (holding whistleblower statute is limited to violations of state law).
128. See infra pt. VI.A.
129. See Cavico, supra n. 8, at 570-76.
130. Minnesota, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania are examples. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.932(1); N.D. Cent.
Code § 34-01-20(1)(a); 43 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 1422 (defining good faith report as one "made without
malice or consideration of personal benefit" and based on a reasonable belief).
131. Indiana and Ohio are examples. Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-3(c) ("employee must make a reasonable
attempt to ascertain the correctness of any information to be furnished"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.52(C)
("employee shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to determine the accuracy of any information
reported").
132. Colorado and Louisiana are examples. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-114-102(2) (requiring a "good faith
effort" on the part of a whistleblowing employee to make a prior disclosure to a supervisor); La. Stat. Ann.
§ 23:967(A) (protecting employee "who in good faith and after advising the employer of the violation of law").
133. California, Hawaii, and Michigan are examples.
134. Indiana and Maine are examples. Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-3(a) ("unless the private employer is the
person whom the employee believes is committing the violation"); 26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 833(2)
(prior notice to the employer is not required "if the employee has specific reason to believe that reports to the
employer will not result in promptly correcting the violation").
135. Maine and New Jersey are examples. 26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 833(2) (employee must afford the
employer a "reasonable opportunity to correct that violation, condition, or practice"); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-4
(requirement of notice and opportunity to correct).
136. Florida and Maine are examples. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 448.102(1) (protection does not extend to employee
who has not, "in writing, brought the activity... or practice to the attention of a supervisor or the employer");
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State statutes also differ as to whether an actual, suspected, or prospective violation
is required.137 One state, for example, extends protection to those situations in which a
violation of law "has occurred or is about to occur."' 138  Other states have an "in
violation" requirement, 139 suggesting that something more than a reasonable belief of
wrongdoing is required. 140  In yet other states, a suspected violation suffices. 14 1
Regardless of whether wrongdoing has occurred, states differ as to how egregious any
alleged employer wrongdoing must be. For example, one state requires the wrongdoing
be something more than "merely technical or minimal [in] nature."' 142  Another state
requires that the wrongdoing rise to the level of a felony. 143
State statutes also differ as to available remedies. Many states provide for
equitable relief in the form of an injunction 144 or reinstatement of employment. 145 Other
states limit legal remedies to those available under common law remedies in tort
actions. 146 Still other states allow "any and all damages recoverable at law," including
lost wages and benefits, costs and attorney fees, and punitive damages.147
III. THE ACT'S WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION
Over fifty federal laws relate to whistleblowers, covering such areas as banking,
employment, environment and public health, federal government employment, fraud,
health care, immigration, military, and transportation safety. 148  However, it was not
until passage of the Act in 2002 that employees of publicly traded companies had
federal-level whistleblower protection 14 9 for exposing corporate financial wrongdoing
absent a federal contract.
150
26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 833(2) (employee must first bring the alleged violation to the attention of a person
with supervisory authority).
137. See Cavico, supra n. 8, at 567-69.
138. Rhode Island is an example. R.I. Gen. L. § 28-50-3(1). California also includes a prospective violation
with respect to refusal. Cal. Lab. Code. Ann. § 1102.5(c) (refusal to engage in "an activity that would result in
a violation").
139. Florida, Louisiana, and New Jersey are examples. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 448.102; La. Stat. Ann.
§ 23:967(A); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3.
140. See e.g. Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 354-55 (holding the Whistleblower Act does not require the
employee to specifically identify the law allegedly violated "so long as the alleged facts, if proven, would
constitute a violation of the law").
141. Hawaii, Minnesota, and North Dakota are examples. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62(1); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 181.932(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-20(l)(a).
142. 25 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 1422.
143. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a).
144. Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, and Rhode Island are examples. Cavico,
supra n. 8, at 580 n. 193.
145. Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Ohio are examples. Id. at 580 n. 191.
146. New Jersey is an example. Id. at 579 n. 180.
147. Minnesota is an example. Id.
148. See Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1121-23. The count of federal laws that provide a legal or administrative
remedy to whistleblowers is based on a listing of federal laws found at WhistleblowerLaws.com,
http://whistleblowerlaws.com/statutes.htm (accessed Nov. 5, 2005).
149. Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1064.
150. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a). Under the Act, a publicly traded company is one which has "a class of
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S. C. 781), or that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780(d))." Id.
A detailed review of the Act's whistleblower provision is found in Vaughn, supra n. 28.
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Under the Act, an adverse employment action encompasses any management
action, such as discharge, demotion, suspension, and harassment, which works to
discriminate against a whistleblowing employee in the terms and conditions of
employment. 15 1 Protected whistleblowing conduct includes disclosure of "any conduct
which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of" Security and
Exchange Commission rules and regulations or other federal law designed to protect
shareholders from fraudulent conduct. 152 Disclosure can be made to a federal regulatory
or law enforcement agency, any member of Congress or congressional committee, or a
person with supervisory authority. 153 A corporation's audit committee is to establish
procedures for receiving and handling employee "concerns regarding questionable
accounting or auditing matters."'154  Submissions by employees are to be kept
anonymous and confidential. 
155
Protection also extends to an employee who assists in an investigation, 156 files a
complaint alleging a violation, 157 or participates in a proceeding relating to an alleged
violation. 158 Where a complaint relating to an alleged violation is about to be filed,
protection applies during that period of time if the employer has "any knowledge" of the
pending complaint. 159 In this sense, the Act seeks to provide a safe harbor for a
whistleblower still employed at the company.
For an employee, establishing a prima facie case under the Act is analogous to
establishing a case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.160 The employee
establishes a prima facie case by showing that:
(1) he engaged in protected activity as defined by the Act; (2) his employer was aware of
the protected activity; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as a discharge;
and (4) circumstances exist which are sufficient to raise an inference that the protected
activity was likely a contributing factor in the unfavorable action. 161
The nexus element, item (4), is satisfied by "proximity in time.., sufficient to
raise an inference of causation." 162 A "contributing factor" means "any factor which,
alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the
decision." 163 This test makes it easier for a whistleblower to make a prima facie case
than did earlier federal case law. Earlier case law required whistleblowers to prove the
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
152. Id. at § 1514A(a)(I).
153. Id. at § 1514A(a)(I)(AHC).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (Supp. 2004).
155. Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
157. Id. at § 1514A(a)(2).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. In deciding whether an employer has discriminated under Title VII, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he has protected status; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the defendant demonstrated discriminatory animus in taking that employment
action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
161. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 52. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Marano v. Dept. of Just., 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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protected conduct was "a 'significant', 'motivating', 'substantial', or 'predominant'
factor" in the adverse employment action. 
16 4
If the employee makes the prima facie case, then the employer may have the
opportunity to avoid liability by producing "sufficient evidence to clearly and
convincingly demonstrate a legitimate purpose or motive for the adverse employment
action." 165 An employee who prevails in a wrongful discharge claim under the Act
"shall be entitled to all 'relief necessary to make the employee whole." 166  Relief,
therefore, includes reinstatement, back pay, and compensation for special damages
including costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
167
IV. ONE WHISTLEBLOWER'S TRAVEL THROUGH THE ACT
David Welch's case against Cardinal Bankshares ("Cardinal") represents one of
the first whistleblower cases brought under the Act and the first case in which a
whistleblower won employment protection. 168 Welch joined Bank of Floyd as its CFO
in February 1999,169 well before the corporate scandals that led to the passage of the
Act. Around that same time, he became CFO and Transfer Agent of Cardinal, a bank
holding company that had purchased all of Bank of Floyd's stock. 170 As CFO, Welch's
responsibilities included monitoring and reviewing journal entries and financial
statements for Bank of Floyd and Cardinal. 17 1 As Transfer Agent, he had responsibility
for reviewing stock trades, canceling old stock certificates, and issuing new ones,
172
as well as keeping records of who owned Cardinal's stock, how those stocks were held,
and how many shares each investor owned. 173 Two allegedly improper journal entries,
loose financial controls, and questionable insider stock trades caused Welch to run for
cover under the Act.
A. A Difference of Opinion
In October 2001, Welch wrote a memorandum to R. Leon Moore suggesting that
certain stock trades made by Moore "closely fit" the Securities and Exchange
Commission's definition of insider trading. 174 Moore, who was Cardinal's 175 President,
CEO, and Chairman of the Board of Directors, had allegedly made stock trades at or near
164. Id. (citing Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140).
165. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 53. This is analogous to the burden-shifting test used in a Title VII action.
Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the "burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, Inc.,
483 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Va. 1997) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
166. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(c).
167. Id.
168. See e.g. Krebsbach, supra n. 44; Solomon, supra n. 33.
169. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 3.
170. Id. at 3, 6.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id. at 5, 6 n. 5.
173. See generally U.S. Securities & Exch. Comn., Transfer Agents, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/transferagent.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2005).
174. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 4-5.
175. Cardinal, a bank holding company, had purchased all of Bank of Floyd's stock.
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the end of financial reporting quarters and, on one occasion, had made trades with
knowledge of a not yet publicly announced stock split. 176 One end-of-quarter trade by
Moore that Welch found particularly troublesome was a trade made one day following
the end of a quarter in which earnings had been overstated by nearly fourteen percent.1
7 7
Moore responded by telling Welch that he had cleared the trade with an attorney and
accountant. 178  Based on his understanding of Securities and Exchange Commission
rules and cases on insider trading, 179 Welch questioned the quality of advice Moore had
been given and suggested that he "might consider a second source of opinion."'
180
Nonetheless, Welch never reported his concerns to any member of the board of directors
or Audit Committee other than Moore. 
1 8 1
While Moore's trades continued to be of concern to Welch, two journal entries
totaling $195,000182 caused Welch even more concern. In January 2002, Welch wrote a
memorandum to Moore, stating that Moore was "improperly overriding... internal
controls." 183  Welch had come to learn that Moore had instructed Wanda Gardner,
Cardinal's Vice President and Internal Auditor, to make the two improper journal
entries. 184  Gardner had "[no] appropriate knowledge relating to generally accepted
accounting principles,"' 185 as well as a potential conflict of interest: she was "responsible
for possibly auditing those same numbers." 186 Welch also questioned certain sundry
credit entries made by Moore's personal secretary 187 that would then be reversed the
following year and have the effect of overstating income in the current year.
188
In Welch's view, the journal and sundry credit entries undermined the dual control
system, 189 did not follow generally accepted accounting principles, 19  and had
"the appearance of manipulating income [by] pumping up earnings."' 19 1 Although an
external auditor later corrected the two journal entries made by Gardner, those
176. See Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (insider trading provision of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004)). In order to violate Rule 1Ob-5, the alleged trading must occur
"on the basis of material nonpublic information." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 0b5-1 (2004).
177. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 3.
178. Moore testified that his decision to trade pre-dated any discussions regarding a stock split and that
Cardinal's standard operating procedure for approving trades made close to the end of the quarter involved
consulting legal counsel and accountants. Id. at 40-41.
179. Id. at 4-5, 5 n. 3.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 12.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id. at 11.
186. Id. at 12.
187. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 15 n. 19.
188. Id. at 15-16, 59-60.
189. Welch noted in his written comments on the third-quarter certification that "too many non-accounting
people [were] making [journal entries] w[ithout] Finance review or approval." Id. at 14-15 (second bracket in
original). He also stated that he had not been given a chance to review such entries and that the requirement of
two signatures or "[d]ual control [by itself] does not make an entry meet [generally accepted accounting
principles]." Id. at 15.
190. Welch noted that these practices were inconsistent with the principle of matching, "that income and
expenses be matched against the period in which they are incurred." Id. at 15-16.
191. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 16.
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corrections only went to restating income for the year end, leaving the third quarter
overstatement in place.192 Welch, however, had recommended that the financials be
restated so that investors were not misled when making quarter-to-quarter
comparisons. 193 As proof that those entries were material to investors, Welch pointed to
a twenty-one percent increase in the stock price between September and October. 194
Despite his concerns, Welch signed the consolidated financial statements and
reports of condition (or call reports) which were filed with the Federal Reserve. 19 5
In addition, he did not report any problems to the Securities and Exchange Commission
because "[a]t [his] age it's difficult to change careers and [he] believed [that] before
Sarbanes-Oxley came along [he] would have been terminated."'1 96
B. The "Failure to Understand"
In July 2002, the Act did come along and, with it, came Welch's persistence that
the third quarter financials be restated and internal controls followed. 197
His interpretation of the Act led him to conclude that Cardinal's conduct was
fraudulent 198 because it involved "mishandling even small amounts of money [with an]
intent to deceive." 
19 9
The Act requires publicly traded companies to file two certification forms,
an initial certification and a recurring quarterly certification, 20 with their financial
statements or Form 10-QSB. 201 Both certification forms must be signed by the CEO and
CFO. 202  By signing, the CEO and CFO certify that, based on their knowledge and
belief, the financial reports accompanying the forms "fully compl[y] with the
requirements" of § 13(a) or § 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the
information contained therein "fairly presents, in all material respects" the financial
condition and results of the company. 203 The signatures also certify that the signatories
are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures and
have made use of those controls and procedures. 2 4 The initial certification is required
only for the first Form 10-QSB submitted after passage of the Act.205  Therefore,
Cardinal's initial certification had to be filed with its June 30, 2002 Form 10-QSB.20 6
192. Id. at 13, 32, 54.
193. Id. atl3.
194. Id. at 12.
195. Id. at 16.
196. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 16. Welch was in his early fifties at the time of his whistleblowing. See
Krebsbach, supra n. 44, at 32 ("[T]he 55-year old Welch remains unemployed.").
197. See Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 14.
198. Id. at 15.
199. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of the sundry credit entries that concerned Welch totaled
$4,500. Id. at 15 n. 19.
200. Id. at 9; see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.13a-14, 15(d)-13, 15(d)-14 (2005).
201. Form I 0-QSB is a quarterly report filed by small business issuers within forty-five days after the end of
the first three fiscal quarters of each fiscal year. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308(b) (2005).
202. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(a) (West Supp. 2004); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14 (2004), 15d-14 (2005).
203. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(b).
204. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, 15d-15 (2005); Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 13.
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Moore signed the initial certification. 20 7 Welch, on the other hand, refused to sign
the initial certification and the third quarter certification,208 despite receiving assurances
from Cardinal's external auditor that there were "no violations or potential violations of
laws or regulations, or irregularities involving management and employees."
20 9
In a September 13, 2002 memorandum to Moore, Welch explained his reasons for
refusing to sign, citing once again the allegedly improper journal entries and lack of
internal controls. 210 He also provided to Moore an annotated copy of the initial and third
quarter certification, 2 1 1 and cited the penalties under the Act that a person is subject to
who "willfully certifies" a Form l0-QSB "knowing" that it "does not comport with all
the requirements." 2 12  Welch again pointed to the "material items" that should be
restated in the 2001 third quarter figures,2 13 and emphasized this needed to be completed
for the Income Statement, Balance Sheet, and Cash Flow Statement to accurately reflect
the results and financial performance of that quarter.2 14 Welch also stated that he had
not "participated nor been consulted in" the design of the control procedures, nor had he
evaluated their effectiveness as is required under the Act.2 15 He also complained of his
lack of access to the Audit Committee,2 16 noting that Moore was "the conduit for
information" to the Committee and the board.
2 17
Moore responded to Welch by writing a memorandum which stated, in part, that
Welch needed to provide more detail concerning the alleged problems as well as
218suggestions on each. Moore also emphasized that Welch "must understand that these




Four days after Welch and Moore exchanged memoranda, Cardinal's board of
directors met to address Welch's allegations. 22 1  Moore informed the board that
"no fraud was involved" in the accounting and reporting associated with the third quarter
Form 10-QSB. 222  He also cited his concerns with Welch's performance, including
207. Id. at 10.
208. See generally id. at 6-16.
209. Id. at 7; see also Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 44.
210. Id. at 10-16.
211. Id. at 10.
212. id.
213. Id.
214. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 12.
215. Id. at 13-14.
216. Id. at 14, 25.
217. Id. at 16. Moore testified that it would have been "easy for Welch" to communicate with the Audit
Committee, and denied ever telling Welch not to communicate with the Committee. Id at 42.
218. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 16.
219. Id.
220. This term is borrowed from Jackall, supra n. 8, at 86. Jackall notes that executive-level managers often
blame others "to cover up their own mistakes, or to extricate themselves from [a] potentially embarrassing or
politically untenable [situation]." Id. He then adds, "someone, somewhere is going to become a scapegoat
when things go wrong." Id.
221. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 17-18.
222. Id. at 18.
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errors made by him in past call reports, his failure to train other employees as his backup
and to implement new software, and his "excessive reliance" on internal and external
auditors for help in accomplishing his work.223  Cardinal's counsel, Douglas
Densmore, 224 advised the board as to its options in dealing with Welch's allegations and
the "potential ramifications of terminating Welch at [this] time." 225  Densmore
suggested the Audit Committee meet with Welch and "take corrective action to the
extent [that] Welch's concerns are substantiated., 226
Several days after the board met, Welch called a meeting for the purpose of
deciding upon the corrective action needed to avoid liability under the Act.227
Upon learning that the meeting would be tape-recorded by Welch, and on advice of
Cardinal's counsel, Moore and Gardner immediately left, as did the secretary to the
board.22 8  Welch proceeded with those still in attendance, reviewing the Act and
recounting his allegations of financial wrongdoing at Cardinal. 22 9
Subsequent to this meeting, Densmore requested a meeting with Welch and
Moore. 23  Rather than Moore being in attendance, Densmore was joined by Michael
Larrowe, Cardinal's external auditor and Welch's former employer. 23 1 Larrowe, along
with Densmore, had been instructed by Cardinal's Vice Chairman and Chair of the Audit
Committee, Vernon Bolt, "to meet with Welch, investigate his concerns, and provide a
written report to the [audit] committee." 232 Welch, however, refused to participate in the
meeting on the grounds that his attorney was not present and that meeting with Larrowe
"would not be in his best interests because [Larrowe] was part of the problem." 233
Later that same day, a joint meeting of Cardinal's and the Bank's Audit Committee
was held. Larrowe addressed and dismissed each of Welch's allegations, 234 noting that
the handling of the journal entries was correct and, regardless of how they were handled,
they had no "real effect" on Cardinal's results. 235 Moore repeated many of his concerns
related to Welch's performance and cited additional concerns including Welch's
"inability to control his temper" and failure to properly document certain loan
participation agreements between Cardinal and the Bank of Floyd. 236  He failed,
however, to provide any documentation relating to Welch's performance. 237 Densmore
concluded that Welch "had surfaced issues, but not in the proper way or in a timely
223. Id. Welch testified that Moore's performance allegations were inaccurate. Id at 19.
224. Id. at 17.
225. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 18.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 19.
228. Id. at 20.
229. Id. at 19-22.
230. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 22.
231. Id. at 23. Welch was employed by Larrowe prior to joining Cardinal. Id. at 2.
232. Id. at 19; see also id. at 24, 43, 44.
233. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. For a summary of Larrowe's counter-arguments to Welch's allegations, see id. at 43-50.
235. Id. at 25. Larrowe concluded that Welch's concerns, even those which were technically correct,
"were not relevant because they were not material to the financial statements." Id. at 44. For an account of
Larrowe's report, see id. at 44-48.
236. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 26-27.
237. Id. at 36.
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fashion." 238  He recommended that Welch be suspended indefinitely pending further
action by the board.2 39
The joint audit committees unanimously approved Welch's suspension.24 0 Welch
subsequently received a letter signed by Bolt that informed him that he (Welch) had been
suspended "for refusing to meet with Cardinal's legal counsel and external auditor."
24 1
D. Seeking Shelter from the Storm
Welch filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Commission,
seeking protection under the Act.24 2 He alleged that he engaged in protected activity by
submitting various memoranda to, and holding meetings with, Moore and others
regarding the journal entries. 243  He also pointed to his restricted access to outside
auditors and the Audit Committee and his exclusion from designing and evaluating
financial controls. 244  His complaint, however, was denied in February 2003, and he
filed an appeal.
245
On appeal, the administrative law judge, Stephen Purcell, ruled in favor of
246Welch. Judge Purcell found that Welch had engaged in a protected activity because
several of Welch's allegations "were based on a reasonable belief that violations were
being committed.",24 7 Judge Purcell found that Moore had never labeled as unreasonable
Welch's concerns regarding the two journal entries and that Welch had "convincingly
explained" why he had previously signed financial statements and call reports without
objecting to those entries.248 The outside auditor, Larrowe, "went directly to Moore"
and not to Welch in regards to financial matters,249 and both Larrowe and Cardinal's
counsel, Densmore, "relied heavily on Moore's representations without questioning their
accuracy." 250 In addition, they created "an arbitrary barrier" to Welch's participation in
238. Id. at 25. Densmore stated that "Welch should have been in 'immediate contact' with the Audit
Committee." Id. at 27.
239. Id
240. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 35. Moore testified that he "never had a plan to fire Welch and.., he played
no role in the decision to suspend or terminate him." Id at 41.
241. Id. at 24. Bolt testified that after reading Larrowe's and Densmore's report, "he was satisfied that
Welch's concerns had been adequately addressed." Id. at 34.
242. Id. at 2. The Department of Labor, and specifically OSHA, administers the whistleblowing provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(c) (2004). OSHA provides on its website
access to the Act, along with summary descriptions, information on how to file a complaint and on
investigative procedures, and opinions of the Office of Administrative Law Judges and Administrative Review
Board. See OSHA, Off. of Investigative Assistance, The Whistleblower Program, http://www.osha.gov/dep/
oia/whistleblower/index.html (accessed Nov. 5, 2005).
243. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 53.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2. Denial of a complaint is not unusual. Solomon, supra n. 33. OSHA investigators are trained
in health and safety issues and often lack expertise in finance and accounting. In addition, investigators lack
both subpoena power and adequate time to investigate and in some cases do not interview the complainant. Id.
246. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 70.
247. Id. at 53. Under the Act, a whistleblower does not have to prove actual wrongdoing. A mistaken or
erroneous whistleblower receives protection so long as the belief of wrongdoing was a reasonable one.
Steinberg & Kaufman, supra n. 28, at 452; Vaughn, supra n. 28, at 15-22.
248. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 57.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 58.
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the investigation. 25 1 Judge Purcell found it reasonable for Welch to believe that internal
controls were lacking because the design of those controls and review of entries was part
of his job description 252 and bank auditors consider it problematic whenever too many
employees make journal entries. 253
Judge Purcell also found that Cardinal's top management was "clearly aware of
Welch's protected activities" and that Welch had suffered an adverse employment
action.254 The proximity in time between Welch's protected activities and the adverse
employment action was "itself sufficient to create an inference of unlawful
discrimination." 2 55  Cardinal, in its attempt to rebut Welch's prima facie case, was
unable to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
employment action, irrespective of Welch having engaged in a protected activity.
256
Cardinal's assertion that Welch was suspended and later discharged for his failure to
meet with Larrowe and Densmore without his personal attorney present did not, in the
judge's view, "ring true." 257
Pursuant to the Act's goal of making the whistleblower whole, 258 Cardinal was
ordered to reinstate Welch, purge his file of any references to his whistleblowing
activities, pay back pay and interest, and pay all costs and expenses including attorney
fees. 259 Additionally, Cardinal was forbidden to mention Welch's whistleblowing when
providing references to prospective employers. 260 Almost two years have passed and
Welch has yet to be reinstated.2 6 1
V. THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME? WELCH UNDER VIRGINIA LAW
Under Virginia common law, the facts in Welch lead to a very different legal
outcome. Virginia provides a cause of action for wrongful discharge262 but its
251. Id.
252. Id. at 60 n. 100.
253. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 60.
254. Id. at 61.
255. Id. at 62.
256. Id. at 65-70.
257. Id. at 62.
258. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) (employee "shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the
employee whole").
259. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 71-72. This order was a preliminary order. Id. Cardinal then made an
unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to the Administrative Review Board. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares, ARB
No. 04-054, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-15 (Dept. Lab., Admin. Rev. Bd. May 13, 2004). It then appealed
unsuccessfully in June 2004 to the Fourth Circuit. Cardinal Bankshares v. U.S. Dept. of Lab., No. 04-1791
(4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2004). Judge Purcell then issued a supplemental recommended order in February 2005 that
once again ordered Welch's reinstatement. Supp. Recommended Dec. Or. Awarding Damages, Fees, and
Costs, No. 2003-SOX-15 (Dept. Lab., Off. Admin. L. JJ. Feb. 15, 2005). In November 2005, Welch found
himself in federal court seeking an injunction compelling Cardinal to implement the reinstatement order.
Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 7:05 CV 00546 (W.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2005). For a general overview
of the administrative and judicial procedures related to the Act's whistleblowing provision, see Vaughn, supra
n. 28, at 73-99.
260. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 71-72.
261. Or. Denying Motion for Or. to Show Cause, No. 2003-SOX-15 (Dept. Lab., Off. Admin. L. JJ. Aug. 9,
2005); Telephone interview with D. Bruce Shine, supra n. 44.
262. In Virginia, a claim of wrongful discharge is known as a Bowman claim. King v. Donnkenny, Inc.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (W.D. Va. 2000). In Bowman, two bank employees who held stock in the bank were
discharged after informing the bank's board that the proxies they had cast in favor of a proposed merger had
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exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will 263 are narrowly defined and strictly
construed.2 64 Only three exceptions exist. The first exception is "where the termination
results solely from [the] free exercise of a statutory right." 265 The second is "where a
plaintiff belongs to a class of individuals protected by the public policy of a statute, and
the termination, in and of itself, violates the policy or statute." 266 The third is where the
discharge was based on the employee's "refusal to engage in a criminal act." 267 None of
these three exceptions protected Welch because no Virginia statute provided a public
policy that encompassed his whistleblowing conduct.
A. Not Any Statute Will Do: The Statutory Right and Policy Exceptions
Virginia courts have held that the source of law or policy must be a state statute
268
and the discharged employee must identify the specific statute that establishes the public
policy.269 A federal statute like the Act, therefore, does not suffice, 27 and Virginia does
not have a law equivalent to the Act.27 1 "[W]hile all Virginia statutes reflect public
policy to some degree, 'termination of an employee in violation of the policy underlying
any one of them does not automatically give rise to a... cause of action for wrongful
discharge.'-272 The State has also refused to recognize a general whistleblower
exception to the at-will doctrine273 in situations where the employer has violated
been obtained under threat of employment termination. Bowman v. St. Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 799
(Va. 1985).
263. Virginia's formulation of the at-will doctrine is "[a]n employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave his
employment for any reason or for no reason, upon giving reasonable notice .... Notions of fundamental
fairness underlie the concept of mutuality which extends to a corresponding freedom to the employer."
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808 (Va. 1996) (quoting Lockhart v. Cmmw.
Educ. Sys., 439 S.E.2d 328, 330 (Va. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. King, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
265. Id. at 740.
266. Id.
267. Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709,711 (Va. 2002).
268. Leverton v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting a claim for wrongful
discharge "cannot succeed unless the plaintiff identifies a Virginia statute").
269. Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d. 246, 261-64 (W.D. Va. 2001) (reviewing
Virginia case law on exceptions to the at-will doctrine); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth, 465 S.E.2d at 809
(holding discharged employee did not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge "because he is unable to
identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy") (quoted, in part, in Warner, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 261).
One commentator has noted that "Virginia courts are becoming increasingly sympathetic toward plaintiffs who
are fired for bringing an employer's criminal transgressions to light." Cavico, supra n. 8, at 592 (citing King,
84 F. Supp. 2d at 740). However, the underlying public policy interest must be found in a state statute. King,
84 F. Supp. 2d. at 740; Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth, 465 S.E.2d at 809.
270. See Storey v. Patient First Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 431, 450 (E.D. Va. 2002) ("It is worth emphasizing
that a claim [for wrongful discharge] must find root in a state statute; it cannot have its genesis in an act of
Congress" (internal quotation marks, bracket and citation omitted, emphasis in original)); see also Bowman,
331 S.E.2d at 799-800. The successful whistleblowing plaintiffs in Bowman had alleged a violation of federal
securities law and state corporation laws. The court based its holding in the case solely on the violation of state
law. Id. at 801.
271. Virginia has passed the equivalent of the federal False Claims Act. Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers
Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-216.1-8.01-216.19 (Supp. 2005) (fraudulent claims against state government).
The statute prohibits discrimination against an employee who discloses the employer's fraudulent conduct or
assists in an investigation of it. Id. at § 8.01-216.8.
272. Anderson, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (quoting City of Va. Beach v. Harris, 523 S.E.2d 239, 245 (Va. 2000)).
273. King, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 740; Dray, 518 S.E.2d at 313. Virginia does provide whistleblower protection,
for example, to employees who have been discharged for filing a labor-related health or safety complaint.
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"generalized regulatory mechanisms for business and industry" and the employee
reports it.274  Furthermore, the discharged employee's rights, duties, or "zone of
interests ... must fall within the protective reach of the statute [or regulation]," 275
and the discharge itself must violate the public policy.276  Stated another way,
a discharge that violates only the employee's private interests is not actionable under
Virginia law.
277
All this left Welch with no state cause of action for wrongful discharge under the
first two exceptions-statutory right and public policy. This result is typical of many
plaintiffs who claim wrongful discharge in Virginia. 27 8 The two exceptions, however,
merit further discussion because even if Welch had fallen under one or both
279
he probably would not have been successful in his action for wrongful discharge.
B. A Much Tougher Row to Hoe
Finding an appropriate state statute on which to base his claim is only one of many
difficulties Welch would have faced in Virginia. Significant legal differences exist
between the Act's treatment of wrongful discharge and Virginia's treatment of it because
Virginia courts narrowly construe at-will exceptions. 28  For example, constructive
discharge 28 1 provides a cause of action under the Act2 82 but may not provide one under
Virginia law. 283 More important to the facts of Welch, Virginia raises the evidentiary
burden on the discharged employee by lowering the standard of proof required on the
part of the employer 284 and imposing a potentially stricter causation requirement on
Va. Code. Ann. § 40.1-51.2:1 (2002). The State also provides protection to employees who are discharged
because of having filed or intending to file a workers compensation claim. Va. Code. Ann. § 65.2-308(A).
274. King, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (citing Dray, 518 S.E.2d at 313). In Dray, a quality control inspector was
discharged for reporting unsanitary conditions directly to government inspectors rather than to plant
management. 518 S.E.2d at 313. The employee alleged she had a right under Virginia's Meat and Poultry
Product's Inspection Act to disregard management's directive that she report violations to them. Id. at 314.
The court held the law's purpose was to provide for "inspection programs" and did not confer any rights or
duties on inspectors. Id.
275. Francis v. Computer Learning Centers, Inc., 199 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished disposition).
For example, in Bowman, the discharged bank employees were also shareholders who were denied "the right to
vote.., free of duress and intimidation." 331 S.E.2d at 801. Therefore, the discharged employees fell within
the class of persons that the state's corporation laws were designed to protect. Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 493.
276. Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 492 (citing and quoting Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 918
(Va. 1987)).
277. Id.
278. See Storey, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (discussing the restrictions on wrongful discharge claims and noting
"not even all Virginia statutes may serve as the predicate"); Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 492 (discussing the
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine).
279. The availability of a federal remedy would not necessarily preclude recovery for wrongful discharge
under a state statute or the common law. See Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 332 (finding no merit in defendant's
argument that the availability of a federal remedy precludes a state-based claim for wrongful discharge).
280. King, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
281. "Constructive discharge" is defined as "[a] termination of employment brought about by making the
employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to leave." Black's Law
Dictionary, supra n. 4, at 475.
282. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A)(a) ("demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment").
283. Barron v. Netversant-Northern Va., Inc., 2005 WL 2242741 at *4 n. 4 (Va. Cir. July 14, 2005)
(noting the Virginia circuit courts are split as to whether constructive discharge is actionable).
284. Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 698 (Va. 1998) ("[i]f you find by a preponderance of
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the employee.
2 85
In Virginia, an employer is held to a lower burden of proof than required by the
Act in countering a discharged employee's claim. The Act requires the discharged
employee to establish, inter alia, that the employee had engaged in a protected activity
and the protected activity was likely a contributing factor in the discharge. 286 If the
employee establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to clearly
and convincingly show a legitimate business reason for the discharge. 28 7 In contrast,
Virginia does not make use of a burden-shifting test in wrongful discharge suits,
288
and the evidentiary burden placed on the employer is a preponderance standard.2 89
Although Cardinal did not meet the standard of proof required by the Act,290 it might
have presented enough evidence 29 1 to prevail under a preponderance standard.
Virginia magnifies the lower standard of proof applied to the employer by placing
a potentially stricter causation requirement on the discharged employee. As a general
rule, Virginia applies the proximate causation standard of negligence law to wrongful
discharge. 292 The State, therefore, requires a plaintiff to establish a "sufficient" prima
facie case as to proximate causation in order to reach the jury.293  What qualifies as
sufficient, however, depends on the wording of the Virginia statute involved. 294 In some
cases, the wording of the statute is such that the prima facie case must establish that the
protected conduct was the "sole [proximate] cause" of the employee's discharge. 295
Under a "sole cause" standard, mere proximity in time between the employee engaging
in the protected conduct and the discharge, "without more," is not enough to satisfy the
sole cause element.
296
A less restrictive causation requirement applies when the statute is silent on
causation. Rather than sole causation, it suffices to show the discharge occurred
"because of factors that violate.. . public policy." 297  The "because of' causation
standard is more favorable to the employee than either a sole cause 29 8 or mixed-motive
the evidence").
285. Id. at 700 (noting the causation standard "solely" is applied in those cases where the applicable statute
requires that standard).
286. See supra pt. Ill.
287. Id.
288. Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at 207 (refusing to extend the Title VII burden shifting test as formulated in
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, to wrongful discharge suits).
289. Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 698.
290. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 70.
291. Seeid at 65-70.
292. See Kerns v. Shirley Well Drilling, 1986 WL 401732 at *3 (Va. Cir. Feb. 13 1986). A proximate cause
"produces the result .... a cause without which the accident, injury, or damage would not have occurred." Id.
(quoting Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 5.000).
293. Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at 207 (stating Virginia law in civil actions and wrongful discharge suits).
294. Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 700.
295. Id. (finding circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case "that [the plaintiff]
was fired 'solely' because she intended to file a workers' compensation claim" (citing Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at
207)).
296. Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at 207 (stating the "timing of these events and the employer's
knowledge... without more, does not raise an inference that the plaintiff was fired solely because she intended
to file a workers' compensation claim").
297. Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 700.
298. Id. (distinguishing the "because of' test from a requirement the plaintiff prove the "employer's
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standard, 299 but arguably less favorable than the Act's contributing factor test.
300
Under the contributing factor test, proximity in time is sufficient to raise an inference of
wrongful discharge. 30 1 More might be required under the "because of" test, which lies
closer to a test not adopted by the Act, the motivating or substantial factor test.
302
The "because of' test considers what motivated the discharge. 30 3  If the employer's
motivation for discharging the employee involved a legitimate business reason and the
jury finds it was more likely than not the employee was discharged because of this
business reason, the employer prevails.
30 4
Where might all this have left Welch if Virginia had a state version of the Act or
some other applicable statute? If the statute made use of the sole cause language of other
Virginia whistleblower statutes, 30 5 Cardinal might have been able to rebut Welch's
claim that the discharge stemmed solely from his whistleblowing. 306  Cardinal, for
example, had argued that Welch's discharge resulted "solely [from his refusal] to meet
with Larrowe [and] Densmore without a personal attorney."30 7  It also pointed to
Welch's performance, arguing that if Welch had not been discharged when he in fact
was, "he most certainly would have been fired by us later in October." 30 8 While both of
Cardinal's arguments failed under the Act's contributing factor test and its clear and
convincing burden of proof,30 9 those arguments could be enough when adjudicated
under a sole factor test coupled with a preponderance standard. 3 1  Cardinal's argument
might also prove successful under the more lenient "because of' test. A reasonable jury
could find that Cardinal discharged Welch either because of his performance or his
failure to meet with Larrowe and Densmore.
C. Grasping at the Final Straw: The Criminal Act Exception
The third exception--criminal act-merits discussion because it protects
whistleblowing conduct left unprotected by the Act.3 11 Virginia provides the criminal
improper motive [as] the sole cause of the wrongful termination").
299. Under a mixed-motive standard, if the employee shows a discriminatory reason for the discharge,
the employer can still prevail if it can show the reasons for the discharge "included a legitimate [business]
reason" and the discharge would have occurred regardless of any discriminatory reason. Id. at 698 (holding
trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's mixed motive jury instruction). Virginia has not adopted the
mixed motive standard. Id. at 700.
300. See supra pt. Il.
301. See Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 62.
302. See supra pt. III.
303. See Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 698 (noting "[tihe question before [the jury] is what motivated
the termination").
304. Id.
305. See id. at 700.
306. The employer can prevail in a wrongful discharge suit if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employee was discharged for legitimate reasons. Id at 699.
307. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 62 (emphasis added).
308. Supp. Recommended Dec. Or. Awarding Damages, Fees, and Costs, supra n. 259.
309. See Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 53 ("Respondent may avoid liability.., by producing sufficient evidence
to clearly and convincingly demonstrate a legitimate purpose or motive for the adverse personnel action.").
310. See Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 700.
311. Under the Act, refusal to participate in alleged wrongdoing, absent a disclosure to a public body or
"person with supervisory authority," would have left Welch unprotected. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514(A)(a)(1),
1514(A)(a)(2); see also Cherry, supra n. 6, at 1064; Steinberg & Kaufman, supra n. 28, at 451.
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act exception because "the employment-at-will doctrine [should not] serve as a shield for
employers who seek to force their employees, under the threat of discharge, to engage in
criminal activity." 3 12 Welch believed the two journal and sundry account entries were
11 31331
"misleading to the financial statement reader" and constituted fraud.3 14  He also
believed "failure to correct known problems could be construed as fraud." 3 15 However,
he never alleged that Cardinal engaged in fraudulent accounting practices.3 16 Rather, he
alleged that his discharge resulted from his engaging in a protected activity as defined by
the Act.3 17  Therefore, all he was required to show was that he reasonably believed
Cardinal's conduct to be prohibited under the Act.318 A far more difficult legal burden
would have awaited him in a Virginia state court.
To fall under Virginia's third exception, Welch would have had to allege both that
Cardinal's officers engaged in fraudulent conduct 3 19 and that he was discharged for
refusing to "consent to commission" of fraudulent accounting entries. 32  Discharge
relating to disclosure would not suffice. 32 1  In addition, the allegation of fraudulent
conduct would have to be rooted in a state statute "designed to protect the property
rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare" of the general public.3 22 Finally,
the statute itself would have to be one that created or imposed a legal duty on the part
of Welch.
3 2 3
Virginia has two statutes that apply to fraudulent conduct on the part of officers of
a bank. 324  The first statute, Virginia Code § 6.1-122, proscribes "false entry in any
312. Rowan, 559 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (Va. 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
313. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 15.
314. Id. at 15 (testifying "even small amounts of money would violate Sarbanes-Oxley as long as there was
the intent to deceive [and] the aforementioned journal entries and insider trading constituted fraud"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 20 (believing Moore and others at Cardinal were "parties to
fraudulent acts").
315. Id. at 19.
316. Telephone interview with D. Bruce Shine, supra n. 44; see Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 50.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Telephone interview with D. Bruce Shine, supra n. 44; see also Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 252
(holding trial court did not err in dismissing wrongful discharge claim because plaintiff did not allege her
employer discharged her for refusal to engage in a criminal act).
320. See Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 252-53 (Plaintiff "did not allege that her employer discharged her for
refusing to commit [simple assault]. Instead, she alleged that she was fired for refusing to consent to the
commission of a battery." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
321. Storey, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (noting discharged employee's allegation reflected the discharge was in
response to employee's disclosure of illegal acts).
322. Id. at 451 (quoting Leverton, 991 F. Supp. at 493).
323. See generally Storey, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 453; Anderson, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 522; Warner, 149 F. Supp. 2d
at 262-63. The criminal act exception is analogous to the statutory right exception. Under the criminal act or
statutory duty exception, the employee is terminated for refusal to violate a legal duty. Under the statutory
right exception, the employer's discharge of the employee interferes with or violates the employee's exercise of
that right. See Anderson, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 522; Rowan, 559 S.E.2d at 711-12 (describing an employee who
had discovered embezzlement and was discharged in connection with her testifying at employer's criminal
trial) (holding Virginia's obstruction of justice statute did not create any statutory right or corresponding public
policy exception that would extend protection to employee).
324. Va. Code Ann. §§ 6.1-122 (1999), 18.2-113 (2004); see Roger D. Groot, Embezzlement and Related
Crimes E7 §§ 12-14, in Va. Prac. Series Crim. Offenses & Defenses (West 2005) (available at Westlaw, "VA
PRAC CROFDEF E7" database).
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book, report or statement of such bank... with intent" to defraud the corporation or
deceive a corporate officer. 325 Conviction for false entry carries with it a payment of a
fine and imprisonment of from one to ten years.32 6 The second statute, Virginia Code
§ 18.2-113, proscribes "fraudulent entries... in accounts by officers or clerks of
financial institutions." 327 A fraudulent entry is an entry made328 "with [the] intent, in so
doing, to conceal the true state of such account." 329 A person convicted for fraudulent
entry is guilty of a Class 4 felony3 30 and subject to imprisonment of two to ten years.3 3 1
Personal or third party financial gain resulting from the false or fraudulent entry is not a
required element of either crime.
332
As a threshold matter, it is very likely that Welch could have shown that either
statute served as the basis for a wrongful discharge claim. Because the statutes address
fraudulent conduct, 333 they are designed to protect the property rights of the general
public. 334  The statutes also impose a legal duty on Welch as a bank officer.
Therefore, he falls within the class of individuals the statutes are designed to benefit or
protect.
335
From this point forward, however, Welch would have faced difficult legal
challenges. For example, to show a false entry, as is required by § 6.1-122, Welch would
have to show more than a reasonable belief the entries were false.336 Rather, he would
have to show the entries were in fact false. 337 This might have proved a very difficult
325. Va. Code. Ann. § 6.1-122.
326. Id.
327. Id. at § 18.2-113. At the time of the alleged wrongdoing in Welch, this statute was limited to banks and
joint stock companies. The statute was revised in 2003 and now encompasses corporations. Id.; Va. Bill
Status, Va. Gen. Assembly H. 2109, 2003 Reg. Sess. (Jan. 8, 2003).
328. Includes "makes, alters or omits to make." Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-113.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Virginia Crime Codes § LAR-2336-F4 (2005).
332. Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-122; see id. at § 18.2-122 ("with the intent of concealing the true state of the
account or to defraud the entity or to enable or assist any person to obtain money to which the person is
entitled" (emphasis added)); Groot, supra n. 324, at § 12 ("conviction [under § 6.1-122] does not depend upon
proof that money was actually obtained"); see also id at § 14.
333. The crime defined by § 6.1-122 is similar to that of § 18.2-113, with the notable exception that an entry
under § 18.2-113 need not be a false one. Groot, supra n. 324, at § 14 ("entries need not be false"); see
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 127 S.E. 368, 373 (Va. 1925) (noting the statute "is not directed against false
entries; but against any entry made with intent to conceal" (emphasis in original)). An entry is not false if it
truthfully records a fraudulent transaction. Id. at 372. While a person charged with both crimes can demand
separate trials, a person who intends to conceal under § 18.2-113 "probably also has the intent to deceive one of
the officials" included in § 6.1-122. Groot, supra n. 324, at nn. 75, 77.
334. See Anderson, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (concluding that a statute prohibiting the use of forged documents
protects the property rights of the general public).
335. Id. (noting "a statute's protective reach may extend to those who have a legal duty under [the] statute").
336. See Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 578, 582 (Va. 2003) (stating it is "well settled
that a misrepresentation, the falsity of which will afford ground for an action for damages, must be of an
existing fact, and not the mere expression of an opinion" (quoting Mortarino v. Consultant Engr. Services, Inc.,
467 S.E.2d 778, 781 (Va. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth, 465 S.E.2d
at 808 (refusing to extend at-will exception to employee who was discharged for his refusal to repair a car
because he "believed that this method of repair was unsafe").
337. See Cohn, 585 S.E.2d at 582; Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth, 465 S.E.2d at 808. Little Virginia case law
directly deals with § 6.1-122 or § 18.2-113. The Mitchell case, 127 S.E. 368, addressed § 18.2-113's
predecessor statute. A search of Westlaw's "VA-CS-ALL" database on November 5, 2005, using the terms
"6.1-122" or "18.2-113" revealed no state or federal appellate cases which directly dealt with either statute.
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thing for Welch to do given the subjective nature of accounting 338 and the difference of
opinion that existed between the two certified public accountants involved, Welch and
Larrowe, as to the entries' proper accounting treatment. 3 39 In addition, Welch was not
specifically asked by Moore to "make, alter or omit to make" those entries, 34 making it
questionable as to whether Welch's refusal to certify receives protection under the
statute. He might have been found complicit in the alleged crime by his earlier signing
of the call reports,34 1 thereby undermining his claim of refusal.
342
Putting aside the falsity of the entries at Cardinal or any alleged complicity on
Welch's part, Welch would have had to produce "sufficient facts" 34 3 to satisfy the intent
element contained in both statutes. 344 A reasonable belief that Moore or others intended
to misrepresent the facts is not enough.34 5  Welch lacked direct evidence of intent to
deceive or conceal, and some of the circumstantial evidence he did have might show the
opposite: Cardinal had corrected the entries that Welch questioned,3 46 and a number of
Welch's concerns had more to do with the potential for error, namely inadequate
controls. 34 7 Cardinal's corrections were not to Welch's satisfaction, but the discharged
employee's satisfaction is not the test in Virginia for establishing intent.34 8 Inadequate
financial controls that lead to erroneous entries in accounts might satisfy a negligence
standard but fall short of the statutes' required mens rea. Instead, evidence must be
presented that establishes the employer "intentionally and knowingly" engaged in the
allegedly fraudulent conduct.
349
In summary, without the Act, Welch had no viable cause of action for wrongful
discharge in Virginia. He correctly believed the Act provided the only legal protection
available to him.
350
VI. IN SEARCH OF GREENER PASTURES: WELCH UNDER OTHER STATES' LAWS
Would Welch have fared any better in another state? While a detailed treatment of
this question lies beyond the scope of this article, a cursory review of the law in four
other states-Louisiana, Delaware, Arkansas, and California-proves instructive.
351
338. Seesupran. 14.
339. See Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at II nn. 13, 25, 42-50.
340. SeeVa. Code. Ann. § 18.2-113.
341. See supra pt. IV.A.
342. See Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 253 (suggesting that if a discharged employee had consented to her
employer touching her, the crime of battery disappears and she could not then allege she was discharged for
refusing to consent to a battery).
343. Bowman, 331 S.E.2d at 802 (concluding discharged employees must supply sufficient factual
allegations to support their claim of tortious interference with employment contract).
344. Va. Code. Ann. § 6.1-122 ("with intent" to injure, defraud, or deceive); id. at § 18.2-113 ("with
intent ... to conceal").
345. Cohn, 585 S.E.2d at 578 (applicant sued prospective employer for actual and constructive fraud; listing
"intentionally and knowingly" and "intent to mislead" among the elements of fraud); see Va. Code. Ann.
§ 6.1-122; id. at § 18.2-113.
346. Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 25 (noting the journal entries had been "reclassified").
347. E.g. id at 15.
348. See Cohn, 585 S.E.2d at 582.
349. Id.
350. See supra pt. IV.A.
351. The choice of these four states is discussed above in Part I.B.
2006]
31
Rossler: Running for Cover under Sarbanes-Oxley
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005
TULSA LAW RE VIEW
A. Legally Back in Ole Virginy:352 Welch in Louisiana and Delaware
In Louisiana and Delaware, Welch would probably fare no better than in Virginia.
Unlike Virginia, Louisiana provides no public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
353
but does provide statutory protection to private sector whistleblowers. 354 Louisiana's
whistleblower statute protects an
employee who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of law:
(1) [d]iscloses or threatens to disclose [the violation;]
(2) [p]rovides information to or testifies before any public body [or;]
(3) [o]bjects to or refuses to participate in [a] violation of law. 355




Louisiana has no state law equivalent of the Act, but does have a statute similar to
that of Virginia with respect to fraudulent conduct on the part of bank officers.
35 8
However, to prevail in a wrongful discharge claim, the court requires more than a good
faith belief on the part of the discharged employee that there was a violation of state
law. 359 The discharged employee must establish that a state law was in fact violated.
360
This requirement places Welch in the same position he would find himself in Virginia,
having to allege and prove fraudulent conduct on the part of Cardinal's officers.
36 1
Therefore, in Louisiana, Welch would have had only the Act for protection against
wrongful discharge.
362
A similar result is obtained in Delaware. The State, at the time of the acts alleged
in Welch, provided no statutory protection but did recognize breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing as an exception to the at-will doctrine.363  However, the
covenant exception is narrowly applied, partly out of a concern that the exception could
"swallow the [rule] and effectively end at-will employment." 364 Therefore, Delaware
courts show deference to the at-will doctrine, 3 65 giving employers "wide latitude" in
termination decisions of at-will employees. 36 6 This wide latitude extends, for example,
352. Based on the song, Louis Armstrong, Carry Me Back To Ole Virginy, in Vocal Duets with Ella and
Louis (Goldies 2000) (CD).
353. Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d at 546.
354. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:967.
355. Id.
356. Hale, 886 So. 2dat 1215-16.
357. La. Stat. Ann. § 30:2027 (2000).
358. Id. at § 6:420 (2005) (prohibiting false entries).
359. Hale, 886 So. 2d at 1214.
360. Id. at 1215 (holding the discharged employee must establish the employer's practices were in actual
violation of a state law in order for employee to prevail under Whistleblower Statute).
361. See id.
362. Louisiana does not recognize a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d
at 546.
363. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 441-42 (discussing exceptions to the at-will doctrine).
364. Id. at 442. The case goes on to discuss the narrow application of the covenant exception. Id. at 442-44.
365. See id. at 440 (noting the at-will doctrine remains a "heavy presumption").
366. Id. at 441 (noting "an employer has wide latitude" (quoting Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc.,
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to preclude an employee who is discharged absent good cause3 67 or because of the
employer's hatred of, or ill will toward, the employee.
36 8
To prevail in a wrongful discharge suit under the covenant exception, the
employee's discharge must involve bad faith on the part of the employer 369 -"an aspect
of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment 370 or a violation of a clear mandate of public policy.37 1 The bad faith
category extends to allow promissory estoppel as the basis for a wrongful discharge
claim. 372 Estoppel arises where the employer promised employment protection to the
employee as consideration for the employee disclosing alleged wrongdoing that the
employee was not under a duty to disclose and then discharged the employee following
the disclosure. 373 Welch does not fall under the bad faith exception. Cardinal did not
manufacture a fictitious basis for Welch's discharge, 374 and Welch initiated the
disclosure at Cardinal.3 75
Welch does not fall under the public policy category either. He would fail to
satisfy the first prong of the two-part test required by Delaware courts: "(i) the employee
must assert a public interest recognized by some legislative, administrative or judicial
authority and (ii) the employee must occupy a position with responsibility for advancing
or sustaining that particular interest." 376 Welch fails under the first prong because the
public policy category does not include disclosing questionable, but not illegal, financial
and business practices. 377 Welch in Delaware, therefore, would find himself in the same
position as in Virginia and Louisiana-having to allege and prove an illegal practice.
378
Welch might not fare any better under Delaware's newly enacted Whistleblowers'
Protection Act.379 The Delaware Act provides protection to private sector employees
who "[refuse] to commit or assist in the commission of a violation, as defined in this
chapter ' 38° or "[report] verbally or in writing to the employer. . . a violation, which the
employee knows or reasonably believes has occurred or is about to occur."
3 8 1
606 A.2d 96, 101 (Del. Supr. 1992))).
367. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 441 (approving of idea that a breach of the covenant "cannot be predicated
simply upon the absence of good cause for a discharge" (quoting Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d
781, 788 (Conn. 1984))).
368. Id.at441.
369. Id. at 442-44 (discussing good and bad faith).
370. Id. at 440. For example, misrepresentation of some important fact the employee relies upon in making
an employment decision or where the employer uses its superior bargaining power to deprive the employee of
fair compensation. Id. at 440, 442. It also includes situations where the employer created false grounds and
manufactured records to support a fictitious basis for discharge. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 444.
371. Id. at441-42.
372. Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 393-94 (Del. 2000) (holding promissory estoppel may provide the basis
for a wrongful discharge claim).
373. Id. at 399 (listing elements of promissory estoppel in context of wrongful discharge).
374. See Pressman, 679 A.2d at 444.
375. See supra pt. IV.A-B.
376. Lord, 748 A.2d at 401 (citing Pressman, 679 A.2d at 441-42).
377. Pressman, 679 A.2d at 442.
378. See e.g. Lord, 748 A.2d at 402.
379. Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1701-1708.
380. Id at § 1703(3).
381. Id. at § 1703(4).
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A violation includes "an act or omission by an employer" that is "materially inconsistent
with, and a serious deviation from, financial management or accounting standards
implemented pursuant to a [federal] law, rule, or regulation." 382 Case law interpreting
the Delaware Act is limited to a single case,3 83 and the courts have not addressed the
materially inconsistent and serious deviation standard. Whether Cardinal's journal and
sundry account entries rise to the level of a serious deviation is arguable given
384Sarbanes-Oxley's "fairly presents" standard, as is the objective reasonableness of
Welch's belief that a serious deviation had occurred. Accounting contains subjective
elements, and the two certified public accountants involved, Welch and Larrowe,
differed as to the entries' proper accounting treatment.
385
B. Seeing Daylight: Welch in Arkansas
Welch probably fares better in Arkansas than in Virginia. Arkansas recognizes
three exceptions to the at-will doctrine: "(1) where an employee relies upon a personal
manual that contains an express provision against termination except for cause;
(2) where the employment agreement contains a provision that the employee will not be
discharged except for cause, ' 386 or (3) if the employee "is fired in violation of a
well-established public policy of the state." 387 Additionally, the exceptions encompass
both actual and constructive discharge.
388
The public policy exception extends to discharge that results from reporting a
violation of state or federal law.3 89 The Act certainly qualifies as a federal law, and
Welch did report suspected violations of that law to Moore and others with supervisory
authority at Cardinal. 390 Similar to the Act, Arkansas's protection extends to discharge
stemming from the whistleblowing conduct itself.39 1 In other words, Welch would not
have to establish that the practices he reported to Cardinal management were in actual
382. Id. at § 1702(6)(b).
383. Tome, 902 A.2d. 757 (describing state employee who sought protection under the Delaware Act
alleging that she was discharged by the State for whistleblowing activity that took place during her prior
federal employment).
384. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(b).
385. See supra nn. 14, 339 and accompanying text.
386. Crawford County v. Jones, 91 Ark. App. 161 (Ark. App. Div. 12005).
387. Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
388. See id. at 386 (defining elements of constructive discharge).
389. Id. (discharged employee had reported his employer's alleged violation of the False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1983)); see also Crawford County, 91 Ark. App. 161 (noting that the discharged
employee had "submitted evidence of several possible violations of state law").
390. Arkansas law suggests that internal whistleblowing would qualify for protection under the public policy
exception. See e.g. Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, Ark. Code. Ann. §§ 21-1-601-21-1-609 (2004) (providing
protection to public sector employees).
391. Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 386 (discussing the public policy exception and concluding that
"to further the public good, citizens.., should be encouraged to report illegal activity").
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violation of the law. 392 Rather, a "good faith" belief that the practices were in violation
of the law would suffice.
393
To prevail on a wrongful discharge claim, Welch would have to present
"substantial evidence" 394 that his reporting of those violations was a factor in his
discharge. 395 This evidentiary burden could be satisfied by showing that Moore held an
"antagonistic attitude" toward Welch 396 and that a "close temporal proximity existed"
between Welch's report and his discharge.
397
However, prevailing in Arkansas might prove more difficult for Welch than
prevailing under the Act because Arkansas applies a preponderance standard to the
employer398 as opposed to the Act's clear and convincing standard.399 Cardinal might
have presented enough evidence to satisfy this lower standard.400 Even if Welch could
prevail, reinstatement would not be an available remedy. Arkansas courts have held that
the public policy wrongful discharge claim is grounded in contract.40 1  Therefore,
Welch's damages would be limited to lost wages and any other tangible benefit that
resulted from the discharge.4 02  Additionally, he would have a duty to mitigate his
losses.
4 03
C. One Tough Act? Welch in California
Welch might fare as well in California as he did under the Act. California provides
both common law404 and statutory40 5 protection for private sector whistleblowers.
Its statutory protection is of interest here because it might provide greater protection than
the Act.406 For example, the statute requires employers to "conspicuously display the
rights and responsibilities afforded to employees. ' '40 7 A "whistleblower hotline" must
392. Analogous Arkansas law supports this point. For example, the Whistleblower Act applies a good faith
standard, prohibiting retaliation by a public employer against any employee who has a "reasonable basis"
for reporting a violation or refusing an order that the employee "reasonably believes" violates a law.
Ark. Code. Ann. § 21-1-603.
393. Arkansas does have a law proscribing false entries in business records. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-202.
However, Welch believed the accounting entries to be misleading and not necessarily false. See supra
pt. IV.A-B.
394. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 65 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Ark. App. Div. 11, III, IV 2002).
395. Id. at 901 (Bird, J., dissenting).
396. See id. at 898.
397. Id. at 901 (Bird, J., dissenting).
398. Id. at 897 (discussing the burden shifting test as applied to wrongful discharge).
399. See supra pt. 1II.
400. See supra pt. V.B.
401. Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (adopting the "exclusive" contract approach). A discharged
employee can also recover under tort if the employer's conduct is "sufficiently egregious or extreme." Id.
402. Gilbert, 65 S.W.3d at 900.
403. Id.
404. A wrongful discharge claim in California is called a Tameny claim. Green v. Ralee Engr. Co., 960
P.2d 1046, 1048 (Cal. 1998). Tameny claims "fall into one of four categories: the employee (1) refused to
violate a statute; (2) performed a statutory obligation; (3) exercised a constitutional or statutory right or
privilege; or (4) reported a statutory violation for the public's benefit." Erskine v. Boeing Co., 2002
WL 31475219 at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 9 2002) (citing Green, 960 P.2d at 1051).
405. SeeCal. Lab. Code §§ 1102.5-1102.8, 1106.
406. See Baker, supra n. 46, at 574-75.
407. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.8(a) ("employer shall prominently display"); Baker, supra n. 46, at 573.
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also be maintained by the Attorney General. 408 The caller's identity and any disclosure
made to the hotline is held in confidence 40 9 to "help foster the early detection of
financial misdoings" and provide a "safer haven of protection" to whistleblowers.
4 10
Last, the statute encompasses a far greater number of laws than does the Act4 11
and includes refusal as protected whistleblowing conduct.
4 12
California's Whistleblower Protection Statute4 13 provides protection to an
employee who (1) discloses to an employer or government or law enforcement agency an
alleged violation of a federal or state law, regulation, or rule or (2) refuses to participate
in "an activity that would result in a violation of' a law, regulation, or rule.4 14 Similar to
the Act, the statute requires only a "reasonable cause to believe" on the part of the
employee that a violation of law has or is about to occur.4 15  In addition,
a preponderance standard is applied to the employee's prima facie case, which must
show that the protected activity was a "contributing factor" in the discharge.
4 16
The California statute places a "clear and convincing" burden of proof upon the
employer in rebutting the prima facie case.
417
Given the similarities between the California statute and the Act, it is likely that
Welch would prevail in a wrongful discharge claim in California. Welch could recover
damages suffered as a result of the discharge,4 18 with reinstatement to his former
position being a potential remedy.
4 19
VII. CONCLUSION
"Whistle blowers are usually right but they also usually get the bad end of the
deal.'A2° The Act might have given Welch the courage to blow the whistle, but he was
wrong when he believed "that before Sarbanes-Oxley came along, [he] would have been
terminated.' 421  The Act did come along and Welch was terminated from his
employment at Cardinal.
408. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.7 ("[tlhe office of the Attorney General shall maintain a whistleblower hotline");
Baker, supra n. 46, at 573.
409. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.7(c) ("shall hold in confidence information disclosed.., including the identity
of the caller").
410. Baker, supra n. 46, at 576, 576 n. 67 (citing Sen. Jud. Comm., Comm. Analysis of SB 777, at 10 (Apr. 8,
2003)).
411. See supra n. 69 and accompanying text.
412. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5(c) ("refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation").
413. The statute is commonly referred to as the "Whistleblower Protection Statute." Baker, supra n. 46,
at 570.
414. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5. In 2003, the California legislature made several changes to the Whistleblower
Protection Statute. Baker, supra n. 46, at 572-73. The legislature expanded the statute's protective reach to
include, inter alia, state and federal rules and refusal to participate in a violation. Id.
415. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5(a)-(c).
416. Id. at § 1102.6. The same test is used by the Act. See supra pt. III.
417. Id. at § 1102.6.
418. Id. at § 1105.
419. Green v. State, 2005 WL 2562887 at *3 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Oct. 12, 2005) (noting reinstatement is a
potential remedy for wrongful discharge).
420. Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 388 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
421. Krebsbach, supra n. 44, at 32; see Welch, 2003-SOX-15 at 16.
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Welch perhaps underestimated the power of the Act to curb a rather predictable
response on the part of management when confronted with dissent or criticism, namely,
to shoot the messenger. 422 Legal protection might dampen this response in some cases,
but human nature combined with a managerial ethos423 suggests it will not in most cases.
While the Act and other state laws encourage proper conduct on the part of managers in
dealing with a whistleblowing employee, that encouragement may be no match for the
immediate and long-ranging sting and sense of betrayal felt by those managers.
424
By challenging a whistleblower at every organizational and legal turn, management
sends a message to those employees who remain working in the organization.
425
Ultimately, employees decide whether to raise concerns with management by taking
clues from the organizational culture.
426
Welch continues to push for his reinstatement, 4 27 finding himself blacklisted by
the banking industry 2 8 and unable to find equivalent employment in the rural, sparsely
populated Virginia community that is home to the Bank of Floyd.4 29  Less lucrative
employment and the legal battle that has raged over the past several years have drained
his and his wife's retirement accounts and left the couple saddled with debt.4 30 For its
part, Cardinal continues to fight Judge Purcell's damages and reinstatement order.
43 1
Cardinal argues, inter alia, that reinstating Welch would prove inequitable to Welch's
replacement, who would then "have to leave Floyd... since available positions in the
Floyd community for someone with his skills are rare. ' '432 Additionally, Cardinal argues
that Welch lacks something that it, as well as the Act, requires of a CFO-integrity.
433
Last, Cardinal argues the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the
422. See generally Jackall, supra n. 8; Wendy R. Boswell & Julie B. Olson-Buchanan, Experiencing
Mistreatment at Work: The Role of Grievance Filing, Nature of Mistreatment, and Employee Withdrawal,
47 Acad. Mgt. J. 129 (2004); Frances J. Milliken, Elizabeth W. Morrison & Patricia F. Hewlin, An Exploratory
Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don't Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. Mgt. Stud.
1453, 1455 (2003).
423. See generally Jackall, supra n. 8.
424. In addition, directors and senior-level managers might "know that there will be little or no consequence
for violations [of the Act] until detection, and even then there will be opportunity to cure." Brown, supra n. 30,
at 372.
425. See Kenneth D. Butterfield et al., Organizational Punishment from the Manager's Perspective:
An Exploratory Study, 17 J. Managerial Issues 363, 377 (2005) (finding that "when managers want others to
learn from a punishment incident, they are more likely to punish in public").
426. See generally Milliken, Morrison & Hewlin, supra n. 422, at 1456-57.
427. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 7:06 CV 00407, Pet. to Enforce Or. of Reinstatement of the
U.S. Dept. Lab. (W.D. Va. July 6, 2006); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 7:05 CV 00546, Pl.'s Pet.
and/or Compl. to Enforce Or. of A.L.J., U.S. Dept. Lab. (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2005).
428. Telephone interview with D. Bruce Shine, supra n. 44.
429. Floyd, Virginia, is located forty miles southwest of Roanoke, Virginia. Floyd Virginia Online, Visitor's
Guide to Floyd, http://www.floydvirginia.com/visitors.html (accessed Nov. 24, 2005). Floyd's population in
the 2000 Census was 432. U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: Floyd Town, Virginia (available at http://
factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en).
430. Solomon, supra n. 33.
431. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 7:05 CV 00546, Defs. Reply Memo. in Support of Defs.
Mot. to Dismiss and Memo. in Opposition to P1's Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (W.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2005).
432. Id. at 23.
433. Id. at 19-23.
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reinstatement order because it is a "preliminary order," an argument the district court
found persuasive in dismissing Welch's petition for enforcement.
434
Irony never seems in short supply in cases involving whistleblowing. If the Act
had not come along, Welch would probably have remained silent, thereby keeping his
reputation and career prospects intact. Alternatively, he might have spoken up regardless
of any legal protection and still have been discharged, in which case he would have
moved on with his life after learning he had no legal recourse in Virginia. Instead, he
finds himself in circumstances familiar to a great many whistleblowers-protected by
law but still penalized with impunity.
Paul E. Rossler*
434. Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 7:05 CV 00407 (Oct. 5, 2006) (mem.).
* Associate Professor, School of Industrial Engineering & Management, Oklahoma State University.
J.D. Candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law (2007); Ph.D., Virginia Tech (1991); M.S., Virginia Tech
(1988); B.I.E., GMI Engineering & Management Institute (1984).
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